Beyond the Battlefield: Rethinking Revolution in Military Affairs

Introduction

Military revolutions occur to the fullest solely when the entire nature of society recasts itself, forcing its armed services to change simultaneously at every level—from culture and technology to strategies, tactics, organizations, doctrines, tactical goals, and logistics. By doing so, they facilitate the military to succeed in their objectives more efficiently. Moreover, military revolutions do not replace one another but rather layer on top of previous ones (Kak, 2000).

Contemporary society experiences the emergence of new technologies that foster revolutionary changes in the nature and conduction of warfare. Despite this variable, it is rather puzzling whether new technologies shape Military Affairs. Hence, this paper asks: Does the emergence of new technologies lead to a renewed revolution in Military Affairs?

Furthermore, this paper suggests that new technologies are essential for the future military advantage. However, these do not constitute a new revolution in Military Affairs. By Military Affairs this article indicates a variety of topics that do not only encompass military equipment, personnel, or facilities but also methods, doctrines, the military’s strategic and tactical objectives, as well as organizational concepts. With this definition in mind, the paper argues that the change we are experiencing today is limited just to the technological sphere and does not create a truly meaningful military revolution.

The paper is structured as follows: the first section provides historical background on the evolution of warfare by presenting the theory of generational warfare. The second section proceeds by presenting the roots of present-day Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) through the Soviets’ conceptualization of the first Military-Technical Revolution. The third section sheds light on some features of RMAs and examines some of the new technologies that have been incorporated into warfare. The last section provides a conclusion, with a summary of the article.

Figure 1: Innovative Autonomous Warfare Technology (Daniel Morgan, 2018).

Historical Background: Theory of Generational Warfare

Over time, warfare has evolved through different strategies and technologies. Wars have been classified based on their forms of manifestation, typologies, and ways of being approached. Scholars have adopted the term "generation warfare" to highlight the evolution of warfare based on the qualitative and generational changes that war itself has undergone (Neculcea, 2020). The emergence of a new generation of warfare not only highlights the significance of past generations but also sheds light on the current landscape of modern warfare, particularly the role of new technologies and the debate over whether this evolution constitutes a revolution (Neculcea, 2020).

Generally, scholars divide the evolution of warfare into four generations, each defined by its distinct characteristics: 1st generation, or 1GW (manpower); 2nd generation, or 2GW (firepower);, 3rd generation, or 3GW (maneuver); and 4th generation, or 4GW (information/network-centric) (Neculcea, 2020). There is an ongoing debate on whether this 4th generation of warfare caused a revolutionary change in Military Affairs or not (Echevarria, 2005).

Figure 2: French soldiers operating a Saint-Étienne machine gun, World War I (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2024).

The concept of 1GW appears with the advent of the modern state, extending from the early medieval times up to the Napoleonic era. In the first generation, the methods used were of a conventional nature and emphasised the physical strength of the soldiers; some of the key elements of this type of warfare were obedience, compact fighting formations, and the implementation of strict orders (Neculcea, 2020). This generation created a “military culture of order” (Neculcea, 2020, p.312), in which civilians were easily distinguishable from the military.

The transition from First Generation to Second Generation was a gradual and lasting one, spanning decades. The Second Generation comes with the Industrial Revolution, the rise of nationalism and consequently the deployment of firearms (Neculcea, 2020). This generation of warfare culminated with the First World War, which focused on the planning of artillery fire combined with the synchronized execution of the manoeuvre which resulted in the stationary period of the trenches (Neculcea, 2020). The Third Generation of warfare appears as a response to this increase in firearms on the battlefield and as a solution to the trenches. This generational change, enabled by the technological changes of the 20th century, developed new non-linear tactics and the ability to engage and execute fire from behind the enemy positions (Blyznyuk et. al, 2016).

Finally, by the end of the 20th century, in response to WW2, the Fourth Generation of warfare—modern warfare—employed all available networks, including political, economic, social, and military (Neculcea, 2020). In this current generation, the lines between war and politics and between combatants and civilians are blurred. The nation-state is not only willing to accept casualties but also prepared to fight for long periods of time (Echevarria, 2005). Nowadays, there is still an ongoing debate on whether this generation is a form of insurgency or not and whether it has brought a radical change in Military Affairs (Echevarria, 2005).

Figure 3: Fifth generation of warfare as a new type of war (2023).

MTR: The Roots of Present RMAs

To understand the debate surrounding the current change in Military Affairs, it is important to trace the roots of Revolutions in Military Affairs and draw a brief comparison. This method allows to identify the characteristics of RMAs and how they can be successful.

The roots of Revolutions in Military Affairs can be traced back to the mid-1970s and early 1980s when the West capitalized on technological and scientific advancements in order to neutralize the threat of the Soviet Union. Although the US was leading the technological groundwork for the RMA, Soviet scholars were the first to theorize and argue that the technological changes were transforming the nature of war and consequently dubbed the change under the “Military-Technical Revolution” (MTR). Just a decade later, the US adopted and adapted this Soviet approach to new technologies designating it as the RMA(Adamsky, 2008).

Despite the Soviet technological inferiority when compared to the West, the USSR was able to rely on the Western scientific advantage and exploit it as a frame of reference for their theorization (see Table 1). As a matter of fact, the Soviets successfully turned the old doctrines into new operational forms and adapted them to the new framework of emerging weaponry. Therefore, they realized the need for new forms of combat operations and to “develop an architecture that would consolidate the reconnaissance systems with high precision, fire-destruction elements, linked through the command and control channels” (Adamsky, 2008, p. 272). In other words, the Soviets did not focus on questions of costs or feasibility for the specific innovations but rather on the assumption that “families of new technologies would eventually be introduced, and to examine the tactical, operational, and strategic implications of technological trends” (Adamsky, 2008, p. 282).

It was only at the end of the Cold War that the Pentagon began to show interest in Soviet MTR theories and to acknowledge the validity of the Soviet proposals regarding the changes in warfare operations (Adamsky, 2008).

Figure 4: The Global Cold War (Harvard University).

Characteristics of a successful RMA

In the next two sections, the article will explain a series of data and figures that will help sustain the main argument of this paper.

By retracting past historical variables, it is possible to draw a series of features that constitute RMAs and therefore how to successfully exploit the new technologies for a military advantage. As shown in Table 1, these characteristics illustrate notable instances of past RMAs.

Table 1:

RMAs features	Instances
Rarely brought up by dominant players, often exploited first by someone other than the nation inventing the new technologies.	The Soviets were technologically inferior to the West, but they were able to rely on the Western scientific advantage and exploit it as a frame of reference for their theorization.
RMAs are not always technology driven.	American combat tactics during the Revolutionary War brought revolutionary change in land combat without any change in the weapon technologies.
Successful RMAs include three components: technology, doctrine and organization.	The Blitzkrieg RMA resulted from the combination of the tank, two way radio, and the operational concept of dive-bomber technologies.
Military institutions must develop a vision of how war may change in the future, or they are incapable of developing RMAs.	The Soviets forecasted trends of future military operations and realised the dynamism of the war in MTR/RMA.

Table created based on the source: Kak, K. (2000b). Revolution in military affairs—An appraisal. Strategic Analysis, 24(1), 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455192

Today's RMA: New Technologies of Modern Society

The previous section enlisted the characteristics of a successful RMA and the steps that might lead to an RMA. Before proceeding to the core themes of the paper, it is crucial to examine the driving forces leading past RMAs and which new emerging technologies can influence a revolution in Military Affairs.

Figure 3 shows a list of possible RMAs along with the driving forces behind them. The list suggests several relevant information. Firstly, the historical record suggests that technological change in the coming RMA represents a relatively small part of the equation. Moreover, military history over the last eighty years offers cases in which nations with inferior technology have won. Indeed, as previously mentioned (see Table 1), not all RMAs are technologically driven and the crucial element for a successful RMA is conceptual in nature, as it was in the instance of the Soviets. Finally, there is only one example on the list of possible RMAs that is entirely technological and that regards the advent of nuclear weapons. However, since the impact of nuclear weapons has been almost entirely political (except for their first use against the Japanese), even here nuclear weapons have not changed the nature of warfare, outside of great power competition (Kak, 2000).

Figure 5: list of possible RMAs along with the driving forces behind them.

When examining the technological changes of the 21st century, O’Hanlon (2018) identifies five categories and thirty-eight subcategories of new technologies that are used or will be used in the military field and he rates them according to three terms of assessments (moderate, high, revolutionary) in order to determine whether we are undergoing a RMA or not (see Figure 4). As it is possible to notice, out of the five categories and the thirty-eight subcategories, only one category has been identified as revolutionary and that is “Computer and communications.” Even within this main category, only five out of the eight subcategories are identified as being more likely to experience a truly revolutionary change and thus potentially create a military revolution. These subcategories are computer hardware, computer software, offensive cyber operations, systems of systems, and artificial intelligence.

Figure 6: Categories and subcategories of new technologies that are used or will be used in the military field.

The Path Toward RMA: Discussion

This section outlines the main arguments to support the claim that the changes experienced today are primarily confined to the technological sphere. Therefore, it is suggested that technological advancements alone do not result in a truly meaningful revolution in Military Affairs.

As previously mentioned, Military Affairs is defined as a sum of topics that do not only encompass military equipment, personnel, or facilities but also methods, doctrines, the military’s strategic and tactical objectives, and organizational concepts. Additionally, Military revolution is classified as such only when it brings a recast of the entire nature of society, forcing its armed services to change simultaneously at every level—from culture and technology to strategies, tactics, organizations, doctrines, tactical goals, and logistics (Kak, 2000a).

Looking back at history, no revolution in Military Affairs has occurred since the Cold War ended as old methods of combat and legacy systems have not been fundamentally transformed, evolved, or changed the nature of war (Lynch III, 2020). For instance, as the history in Afghanistan or Iraq has proven, even though US politicians disposed of technological advancements, they failed to grasp the complexities of warfare beyond technological superiority. Specifically, they misunderstood that war involves not just technological capabilities but also deeply intertwined political, cultural, and social dynamics (Lynch III, 2020). Indeed, despite the US’s initial hopes for a short and decisive victory, these wars have exposed the inadequacy of US military strategies and planning for technological advancement (Lynch III, 2020). In other words, while there might have been innovations in AI, cyber capabilities, drones, improved communications systems, and precision-guided munitions, they have not introduced entirely new paradigms. Instead, they have built upon existing technologies and have not led to a complete overhaul of military strategies, as, for example, the Industrial Revolution did (Lynch III, 2020).

Figure 7: The Tech Race during the Cold War ( Adam Grossetti, 2021).

Moreover, current developments indicate that, instead of a radical shift, new technologies are merely being integrated into existing military strategies rather than into a completely new doctrinal framework. In the 2022 CRS report, indeed, the US Department of Defense has completed a bottom-up review of the existing technologies and has developed a plan only on how to improve existing military capabilities and not how to enable new ones (Sayler, 2022). As a matter of fact, in the report, it is noticeable that the US military plans are focused only on using new technologies for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in accordance with existing conventional warfare systems and strategies (Sayler, 2022).

Finally, as was pointed out in the 2022 CRS report, there are increasing ethical and legal debates associated with the use of some of the new technologies (i.e., AI or Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems) in warfare (Sayler, 2022). These debates may then act as restraints on the deployment of certain technologies in conflict, limiting existing revolutionary changes (Sayler, 2022).

Figure 8: US Marine Corporals setting up a Multi-Mission Terminal satellite (Michael Kersten, 2022).

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper has first presented a historical background on the theory of generational warfare. More specifically, the first section clarified the evolution of warfare based on the qualitative and generational changes that war itself has undergone and examined the emergence of a new generation of warfare. The paper then proceeded with the explanation of the roots of RMA and the important groundwork theorized by the Soviets in the 1970s (MTR). This section facilitated the transition to the following parts of the paper, which focused more on modern society and the path toward possible future RMAs and helped answer the initial inquiry of the article: Will emerging technologies result in a new revolution in Military Affairs?

The arguments and evidence presented in the previous chapters suggest that while there has been a technological advancement in areas like computers or communication, only a relatively small fraction of these will truly cause a revolutionary change. Moreover, the meaning behind an RMA indicates not only a change in military technologies but also additional advancements and adaptations in warfare methods, doctrine, organizational concepts, and tactical strategies. Most of the new technologies have only been adjusted into pre-existing paradigms and strategies instead of introducing an entirely new framework. As the case of the US shows, nowadays states are primarily focused on enhancing and improving their military capabilities rather than enabling new doctrines and promoting radical change.

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