Ethics Series: Are We More Moral Than Before?

Foreword

Questions like “Why be moral?” or “What do we mean when we say something or someone is morally bad?” have been protractedly debated within the philosophical tradition. This series gives an overview of the traditional and contemporary discussion on the topic of Ethics and morality by focusing on the philosophical foundations of the moral phenomenon and the most relevant schools of thought trying to answer the question: “What should I do?”. Whether in assessing other people’s actions or our own, moral questions are part of our daily lives; their answers shape how we behave and expect others to behave. Thus, giving a philosophical and systematic answer to these questions gains relevance beyond the mere sphere of academic circles. The series explores how the moral question is not just about “good” or “bad” but also about what type of life we want to live and how we advocate for a world that reflects such life choices. The articles will present arguments for and against different schools of thought, showing different ways of behaving and thinking in everyday life according to those theories. Readers are expected to interiorize terminology and the conceptual depth of the development of ethical theory.

Ethics Series is divided into six articles:

1. Ethics Series: To Be or Not To Be?

2. Ethics Series: Reasons to Be Good.

3. Ethics Series: Follow the Rules.

4. Ethics Series: It Is All about the Consequences.

5. Ethics Series: Virtue over Goodness.

6. Ethics Series: Are We More Moral Than Before?

Ethics Series: Are We More Moral Than Before?

After all the discussions held by the philosophical tradition, there is hardly a point of convergence in the idea of what morality is or what morality should be. After all, morality is not just yet another dimension of human existence in its attempts to understand itself and the world surrounding it. Morality goes beyond the mere descriptive enterprise of other types of human knowledge by focusing on the essential question “What should I do?“ as a simplification of the question “What should my actions be given the world I want to see realized?“. It is due to the depth of these questions that disagreements arise. Nevertheless, it is still reasonable to ask whether all the theorising, along with the immeasurable number of experiences lived by individuals and humanity as a collective, has led to some type of progress in the moral domain. “Are we more moral than before and if so, in what way?“ is the question to be explored in this article. Another version of this question could be “Is there moral progress?“. Although it is impossible to give a concrete answer to these questions, different philosophical views on possible answers will be explored. Before that, it will be necessary to assess the basic concept of “progress“. Thus, this article will explore the concept of progress simpliciter, i.e. without instantiating it to the moral dimension. This exposition will be presented as a historical review focused on the Enlightenment period. After that, the concept of moral progress will be assessed from the two main philosophical positions on the issue. The “broad“ and “narrow“ perspectives about moral progress will be presented.

Figure 1. The Phoenix Bird, by Marginean (1990).

Progress: A Historical Overview

The concept of progress is deeply embedded in everyday discussions. We are better off, it is said, than our ancestors that lived three hundred years ago. This type of idea seems reasonable. Nowadays, in many (although not all) parts of the world the material conditions of human existence seem to have “improved“ over the years. The fear of dying from an infectious disease has drastically decreased, and starvation, although by no means eradicated around the world, is absent from some societies. These ideas about progress have material support from which they obtain their truth or falsehood. For example, if one aims at not perishing as an individual, there are measurable tools for assessing whether this has been accomplished successfully. But it seems that in the moral, more abstract, domain this is not as easily evaluated. In his famous book The Idea of Progress, Bury, J. P. (1955) emphasises that the movement of the Enlightenment had a strong influence on the development of the concept of progress.

Bury sees this era as a period when reason was systematically applied to many dimensions of human life. This represented a challenge to traditional dogmas, particularly those rooted in religion. This period was characterized by the belief in the power of human reason to expand knowledge, improve society, and guarantee the continuous advancement of humanity based on an understanding of human nature and the ways to reach its true potential (Ibid). The notion of progress during the Enlightenment, Bury says, was closely linked to the sciences acquiring a “modern“ conception, closer to our contemporary understanding of it, and the emerging belief in the universality of natural laws. This type of thought represented a break from the ancient thought that did not conceive human affairs as completing some sort of progression. Influenced by the scientific revolution, Enlightenment thinkers began to perceive history as a linear progression towards greater knowledge and improvement, rather than a cycle of rise and fall, as it was held in antiquity (Ibid). By understanding the laws of nature, humanity could continuously enhance its condition. A key contribution of Enlightenment thinkers, according to Bury, was their rejection of the idea that human history could degenerate or that civilization was in decline. Instead, they proposed that progress was not only possible but inevitable, provided that reason and science were applied. This belief in the certainty and necessity of progress marked a significant departure from earlier views that saw history as cyclical or guided by divine providence. This perspective laid the foundation for the modern concept of progress, which encompasses not only the advancement of knowledge but also the improvement of social conditions and the potential for ongoing human development.

Of a similar idea is Bruce Mazlish (1963), who highlights two critical aspects that contributed to the emergence of the idea of progress in the seventeenth century. The first one refers to scientific advancements and stable laws. Mazlish notes that the progress in natural sciences during the seventeenth century was fundamental in shaping a new ethos of progress (Mazlish, 1963). The shift from the authority of ancient scholars to modern scientific understanding provided a foundation for believing in progress. This belief, Mazlish agrees with Bury, was grounded on the idea of stable scientific laws. The certainty of these laws was essential for the idea that knowledge and progress could accumulate steadily over time. In the second place, the shift in mentality that led to a new perspective on history, emerging from advancements in visual representation, influenced the idea of progress (Ibid). This new way of viewing space and time led to a re-evaluation of historical perspectives. It allowed people to view past and present epochs on a more equal footing and contributed to the shift away from seeing the past as a source of unchallenged authority. This, one could add, could put into question a set of established traditions and their strength for shaping and commanding human enterprises. This perspective supported the belief that modern times, rather than ancient ones, were more advanced and capable of greater progress. Mazlish additionally notes that the idea of progress, while becoming widely accepted in the eighteenth century, was not universal but primarily a European phenomenon. It faced challenges from critics like Swift, Rousseau, and Malthus. Rousseau questioned whether scientific progress improved morals, while Malthus warned of potential regressions due to population pressures. Despite these critiques, figures like Condorcet maintained a belief in the inevitable advancement of humanity through science and reason. In the nineteenth century, thinkers like Hegel and Marx further developed the idea of progress, with Hegel introducing a dialectical view of historical development and Marx focusing on material conditions and class struggles as drivers of progress. An important point to emphasise in Rousseau’s critique to the idea of progress refers to the validity of the extrapolation of a scientific notion of progress to the moral domain. About this Mazlish says:

What could be doubted was whether or not a necessary connection existed between progress in the natural sciences and progress in the moral and political sciences. It was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who once and for all called attention to this problem and made it a central feature in the intellectual landscape of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Unlike Swift, Rousseau, taking scientific progress as given, went on in his famous Discourse of 1749 to ask whether this progress “had the effect of purifying or corrupting morals.“ (Mazlish, 1963, p. 450).

The point noted by Mazlish about Rousseau is relevant. As mentioned above, there seems to be a practical, more material, way of measuring progress from a scientific perspective, given that scientific development serves the specific function of making humanity’s life easier. Without entering into the specific discussion about the actual role of science’s impact on human life, it is important to note that the modes of assessment of moral and scientific progress differ in nature. From this perspective, Rousseau’s criticism would bring a new perspective to the subsequent understanding of progress. In the 19th century, the concept of progress evolved significantly due to the contributions of philosophers like G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx. Hegel (2017) in his Phenomenology of Spirit introduced the idea that progress was not linear but dialectical, meaning that it involved a process of contradictions and resolutions that drove history forward. He viewed history as the unfolding of the “Spirit“, which becomes actualised through human self-consciousness. This progression towards self-awareness, according to Hegel, also represented a movement toward freedom.

Figure 2. Bulls, by Marginean (n.d.).

Marx (1992) took Hegel’s dialectical method but applied it to material conditions rather than the spiritual, transcendental, realm. In his Capital, Marx argued that material conditions and economic structures were the driving forces behind historical progress, not ideas. Marx believed that the contradictions within capitalism would eventually lead to its collapse and the rise of a communist society, where both individual and societal progress would be achieved. The nineteenth century also saw the rise of historicism, Mazlish argues, which challenged the idea of universal progress by asserting that each historical period has its unique values and should not be judged by universal standards. Oswald Spengler (1928), in his work The Decline of the West, argued that cultures, like living organisms, go through a cycle of growth and decay and that Western civilisation was in its declining phase. This view was a stark contrast to the earlier, more optimistic notions of progress. Despite these diverse views on the notion of progress, the general belief in progress persisted. Modern man, Mazlish argues, sees progress not as a fixed goal but as an ongoing process of development, driven by the pursuit of knowledge and the expansion of human potential (Mazlish, 1963). This redefined idea of progress aligns with the understanding that continuous striving and achievement, rather than any final state, constitute true progress.

Moral Progress: Broad vs. Narrow Perspectives

Now that a brief overview of the evolution of the concept of progress has been presented, the door is open to present a more specific idea of progress regarding the moral domain. For this, the distinction between the three concepts of moral progress will be presented. This is following the distinction presented by Sauer et al. (2021). They discuss the various perspectives on what constitutes moral progress, which can be divided into two main groups. The first group supports a “broad conception“, viewing moral progress as any morally desirable change, whether it be individual improvements in behaviour, global developments like reduced murder rates, or advances in moral theory. The second group advocates for a “narrow conception“, arguing that only certain morally desirable changes qualify as moral progress, particularly those resulting from human moral capacities (Sauer et al., 2021).

The Broad Perspective

Regarding the view of the “broad conception“ the work of Hanno Sauer (2019) critiques the traditional understanding of moral progress that says that moral progress can be measured by the “expanding circle“ of moral concern. This means that the progress of morality involves the expansion of the members of the community that humanity conceives as having a “moral standing“, i.e. that are owed certain treatment on our part and that have moral claims to us. Sauer argues that this concept is overly simplistic and fails to capture the full complexity of moral progress (Sauer, 2019). He suggests that focusing solely on the expansion of benevolence overlooks other critical aspects of moral development, such as justice, equality, and the capacity for moral reasoning. Sauer also questions the connection between moral progress and moral realism, pointing out that tying moral progress to a specific moral framework may limit its applicability across different contexts. He challenges the notion that moral progress can be objectively measured, proposing instead that it is a more complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Sauer advocates for a broader understanding of moral progress that goes beyond the expansion of moral concern and includes a wider range of moral improvements.

Figure 3. Unknown Title, by Marginean (n.d.).

Another defender of the “broad conception“ is Catherine Wilson (2010), who presents the possibility of achieving moral progress without relying on the existence of objective moral truths, a concept central to philosophical moral realism. Wilson believes that moral progress is possible even if moral values are not grounded in objective, mind-independent facts. She says that moral progress can be understood in terms of the improvement of social practices, norms, and institutions that better promote human welfare, fairness, and cooperation. Regarding moral progress, she says that it involves an improvement in material circumstances. She says:

Usually, such improvements in circumstances are not only preceded but are also followed by improvements in the moral beliefs held by members of a population, or in their characters, or what might be called their moral personalities, for a change in circumstances for the morally better is likely to increase the number of persons in a population who recognize the new circumstances as morally better. (Wilson, 2010, p. 2)

Wilson challenges the idea that moral realism is necessary for moral progress by proposing that moral beliefs and practices can evolve through rational discourse, empirical evidence, and the refinement of moral sensibilities. She emphasizes that moral progress can occur as societies develop more effective ways of reducing harm and promoting well-being, even if these changes are not grounded in universal moral truths. Instead, moral progress is seen as a product of social learning, cultural evolution, and the ongoing negotiation of values within communities. By detaching moral progress from moral realism, Wilson opens up the possibility that moral improvements can be made based on pragmatic considerations and shared human experiences, rather than on the discovery of objective moral facts. From this perspective, the worries presented earlier about the independence between scientific and moral progress are given an answer. There is not a complete detachment between a more “materialistic“ view of progress from a moral one. They go hand in hand as they are both influenced by the larger goal of human well-being. Thus, Wilson's position allows for a more flexible and context-sensitive understanding of moral progress, one that can accommodate diverse perspectives and adapt to changing social conditions.

Overall, from what has been presented, the “broad perspective“ can be summarised by stating that it defines moral progress as any morally desirable change, independently of a specific context or scale. Thus, moral progress can occur in various forms, including individual improvements in moral beliefs and behaviour, as well as large-scale societal developments.  Advancements in moral theories or ethical frameworks that provide better guidance for moral behaviour are also considered a form of moral progress. This perspective is inclusive and flexible, acknowledging that moral progress can happen at different levels, from individual actions to global trends, contrasting with the narrow perspective that limits moral progress to specific changes directly related to moral reasoning or capacities. For this theory to have its force, it must be acknowledged that progress cannot lack a perspective from which it is measured. The presented perspective is flexible in its general understanding of the modes in which progress can occur. Either at an individual or collective level, the phenomenon of moral progress, by not being exclusively associated with moral rationality and moral practice, is necessarily related to progress in other dimensions of human affairs. It requires, as a consequence, a further framework of valuation from which the measurement of progress is made. By defining what is valuable we are setting the standards of “goodness“. There are a series of philosophical challenges for those who advocate for the “broad perspective“. One of them is to present a well-founded structure of those standards of goodness. This task would imply an assessment not just at the collective and societal level, but also at the individual level involving aspects of moral psychology. Additionally, the “broad perspective“ must be able to address the vagueness inherent in defining moral progress as any morally desirable change. This definition, being overly ambiguous, lacks clear criteria for what constitutes moral progress, which makes it difficult to evaluate or measure effectively. Moreover, they must explain how the different dimensions of progress, now established as not completely independent from one another, can be measured together. Progress in one domain might not align with progress in another, complicating efforts to form a coherent overall assessment of moral progress.

Figure 4. Unknown Title, by Marginean (n.d.).

Another problem is that the “broad perspective“ could lead to moral relativism. By allowing different contexts to define what counts as moral progress, this approach risks endorsing conflicting standards across societies or individuals. This could undermine the idea of universal moral progress, as what is considered progress in one culture or context might be viewed differently in another. Additionally, the broad perspective may include changes that do not involve the enhancement of moral capacities, such as reasoning or virtue. This inclusion of changes not directly tied to moral development could dilute the concept of moral progress, making it less meaningful. Furthermore, the broad perspective can struggle with distinguishing genuine moral progress from changes that have mixed effects. For example, a societal shift that reduces violence but exacerbates inequality could be seen as progress in one sense but as regress in another, complicating the assessment. The challenge of assessing moral progress on a global scale is also significant, given the vast differences in cultural values, historical contexts, and the potential for value incommensurability. These factors make it difficult to make universal claims about moral progress, as what is considered progress in one culture or era might not hold the same value in another. This last point, along with the possibility of moral relativism, brings up another challenge, i.e. the challenge of making sense of what morality is actually about. Since the moral phenomenon is closely linked to and associated with how individuals and society want to live, it is a potential problem that two incompatible views of life and morality are seen as “progressing“. What might be for some a necessary feature of the world (like, for example, the respect for the autonomy of each person’s body), for others might not be so. From this perspective, how could we talk about progress simpliciter?

On its part, the “narrow perspective“ on the possibility of moral progress focuses on specific kinds of changes that are directly tied to the enhancement of human moral capacities. These changes relate to abilities such as moral reasoning and the ability to follow moral norms. As its name indicates, this perspective is more limited in assessing what is to be counted as moral progress. It does not necessarily link progress in the moral domain with progress in other areas of human knowledge. As a consequence, in this perspective, not every morally desirable change would count as progress. Partially echoing Rousseau’s worries about the separation of science and morality, the narrow perspective argues that moral progress must come from deliberate human action or development, particularly through the exercise of moral capacities, rather than through external circumstances or changes that happen incidentally.

Figure 5. Peisaj, by Marginean (2009).

The Narrow Perspective

Advocates of the narrow view, like Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell (2018), also emphasize the importance of human intentionality in achieving moral progress. They argue that moral progress should involve individuals or societies actively engaging in moral reflection and growth. Progress, then, is not simply about outcomes that benefit humanity but about those that arise from the conscious application of moral reasoning and ethical decision-making. As a result, the narrow perspective excludes some morally desirable outcomes that occur due to factors unrelated to moral growth. For example, if levels of violence decreased as a result of an improvement in technological tools against crime, it does not mean that attitudes towards committing crimes have changed. For a change to be considered progress, it must be the result of deliberate moral improvement, often within individuals or societies. According to Buchanan and Powell, moral progress depends on whether a change results from the exercise of human moral capacities. These capacities include the ability to understand moral concepts, engage in moral reasoning, appreciate moral arguments, and commit to moral consistency (Buchanan and Powell, 2018). They distinguish three different understandings of moral progress. The first and most demanding view requires that moral progress involve changes that result from the improvement or exercise of moral capacities. The second, weaker view, allows for changes that are improvements from a moral point of view, even if they are motivated by non-moral factors such as self-interest. The third, weakest understanding of moral progress considers any change that is morally desirable as moral progress, even if it is entirely independent of human motivation or moral capacity, such as a reduction in disease due to natural causes (Ibid). Buchanan and Powell argue that the third understanding should be rejected because it does not adequately differentiate between morally desirable outcomes and genuine moral progress, which involves a stronger sense of human moral development.

While Buchanan and Powell acknowledge that distinguishing between the first and second understandings of moral progress is more challenging, they are both usually accepted as part of the “narrow perspective“. They acknowledge that moral progress results from a combination of factors that include moral and non-moral motivations alike. They put as an example movements like abolition or the fight against cruelty. These movements were driven, at least in part, by moral reasoning and appeal to moral capacities. Additionally, they engaged moral identities and moral emotions, making it plausible to consider them as examples of moral progress, even if they were also influenced by economic or self-interested motives (Ibid). It is difficult to give an account of global moral progress due to the complexity of moral change across different contexts and the possibility of moral regressions in other areas. As it has been shown, the “broad“ perspective also has difficulties in accounting for a global understanding of moral progress. It seems that judgments about moral progress should remain localised, focusing on specific improvements rather than making overarching claims about the moral condition of the world.

Like the “broad perspective“, the “narrow perspective“ also encounters several challenges that limit its effectiveness. Many of them have been highlighted by Sauer (2019) and Buchanan and Powell (2018). One primary issue is its restricted scope. Since this perspective confines moral progress to changes that arise directly from the exercise or enhancement of human moral capacities, it can exclude substantial moral advancements that occur through other means, such as institutional reforms, technological innovations, or economic developments, which nonetheless lead to significant improvements in moral conditions. For example, a decrease in violence due to the implementation of effective legal systems could be considered moral progress. However, from this perspective, if this reduction is mainly the result of coercive institutions rather than improvements in moral capacities, it may not be viewed as true moral progress. This makes the “narrow perspective“ rather exclusionary. It can dilute the recognition and appreciation of meaningful moral improvements that do not directly stem from moral reasoning.

Figure 6. Spring, by Marginean (1986).

Another significant problem with the narrow perspective is the difficulty in accurately determining the causation behind moral changes. If one follows the narrow perspective’s strict requirements, it becomes challenging to assess whether a particular moral change genuinely arises from moral reasoning or from other non-moral influences. Knowing this with certainty would involve having special access to the motivational set of moral agents, something that is impossible. This can lead to inconsistent assessments, where some significant moral advancements are overlooked or dismissed simply because they do not fit the narrow criteria. Moreover, the narrow perspective should also be able to present a coherent account of some specific philosophical assumptions they make. For example, they must be able to explain what constitutes moral capacities and their role in moral development. Such explanations, of course, might be at the same time contested, which makes the task of holding this view philosophically very demanding. This reliance can result in a lack of flexibility and adaptability in evaluating moral progress, making the narrow perspective less effective in diverse and dynamic moral landscapes. Lastly, the narrow perspective may struggle with its own inherent rigidity by failing to account for the multi-layeredness of moral progress. It can easily overlook the role of systemic and structural changes that enhance moral conditions indirectly. Assuming that material conditions could give the proper context that supports moral behaviour and decision-making, including these aspects in an account of moral progress seems relevant. By focusing primarily on direct moral capacities, the narrow view might ignore how broader social, economic, and political factors contribute to moral improvements. This emphasis can lead to a form of moral elitism, where only changes directly tied to individual or collective moral reasoning are valued, potentially disregarding pragmatic or instrumental approaches to moral betterment that still lead to meaningful progress.

The concept of progress has been a central theme in philosophical discourse, particularly from the Enlightenment onward, where thinkers championed the role of reason, science, and human capacities in driving continuous improvement. While material progress can often be measured in tangible ways, the idea of moral progress presents more complex challenges. Philosophers like Rousseau and later critics questioned whether advancements in knowledge and technology necessarily led to moral improvements, emphasizing the difficulty of assessing moral progress in the same way as scientific progress. This distinction is essential, as the measurement of progress in the moral domain involves abstract concepts and human capacities, such as moral reasoning, rather than concrete material developments.

The debate between broad and narrow conceptions of moral progress, as discussed by Sauer and others, highlights this ongoing tension. While the broad view includes any morally desirable change, the narrow perspective limits moral progress to changes that result from the exercise of human moral capacities. This distinction reflects the deeper philosophical question of what constitutes genuine progress in the moral sphere and how we should understand the relationship between material advancements and moral development. Ultimately, this discourse invites continued reflection on the nature of progress and the values that should guide human efforts towards a better future.

Bibliographical References

Bury, J. B. (1955). The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth. Dover.

Buchanan, A., & Powell, R. (2018). The evolution of moral progress: A biocultural theory. Oxford Academic. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190868413.001.0001

Hegel, G. W. F. (2017). The Phenomenology of Spirit (T. Pinkard, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139050494

Marx, K. (1992). Capital: A critique of political economy (E. Mandel, Ed.). Penguin UK. (Original work published 1867).

Mazlish, B. (1963). The Idea of Progress. Daedalus, 92(3), 447–461. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20026791 

Spengler, O. (1928). The decline of the West. A. A. Knopf. (Original work published 1880-1936).

Sauer, H. (2019). Butchering Benevolence: Moral Progress beyond the Expanding Circle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Springer Nature 22(1), 153–167. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45116558 

Sauer, H., Blunden, C., Eriksen, C., & Rehren, P. (2021). Moral progress: Recent developments. Philosophy Compass, e12769. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12769 

Wilson, C. (2010). Moral Progress Without Moral Realism. Philosophical Papers, 39, 97-116. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641003669508

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