Ethics Series: It's All About the Consequences

Foreword

Questions like “Why be moral?” or “What do we mean when we say something or someone is morally bad?” have been protractedly debated within the philosophical tradition. This series gives an overview of the traditional and contemporary discussion on the topic of Ethics and morality by focusing on the philosophical foundations of the moral phenomenon and the most relevant schools of thought trying to answer the question: “What should I do?”. Whether in assessing other people’s actions or our own, moral questions are part of our daily lives; their answers shape how we behave and expect others to behave. Thus, giving a philosophical and systematic answer to these questions gains relevance beyond the mere sphere of academic circles. The series explores how the moral question is not just about “good” or “bad” but also about what type of life we want to live and how we advocate for a world that reflects such life choices. The articles will present arguments for and against different schools of thought, showing different ways of behaving and thinking in everyday life according to those theories. Readers are expected to interiorize terminology and the conceptual depth of the development of ethical theory.

Ethics Series is divided into six articles:

1. Ethics Series: To Be or Not To Be?

2. Ethics Series: Reasons to Be Good.

3. Ethics Series: Follow the Rules.

4. Ethics Series: It Is All about the Consequences.

5. Ethics Series: Virtue over Goodness.

6. Ethics Series: Are We More Moral Than Before?

Ethics Series: It's All About the Consequences

Consequentialism, a fundamental theory in moral philosophy, presents that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action is primarily determined by its outcomes. This captures the intuition that the consequences of an action are important in moral assessment. According to this view, elements such as motivations and intentions are secondary, influencing outcomes but not being central to the moral evaluation. By treating moral analysis akin to a mathematical calculation, consequentialism attempts to establish clear reasoning on what constitutes a "good" consequence. A crucial distinction within this framework is between what is 'good' and what is 'right,' with consequentialists agreeing that the 'right' action is one that brings about the best consequences, though they may differ in defining those consequences. This article explores the general principles of consequentialism, examining its approach to value, the distinction between promoting and honouring value, and its impersonal nature, before delving into specific consequentialist theories like utilitarianism and addressing notable critiques. The first section will deal with general consequentialism, characterising theories that can be categorised under this label. The second section deals with utilitarianism, the most famous version of consequentialism, Finally, criticism towards consequentialism will be assessed. 

Figure 1: Vasile Kazar. Year Unknown. Untitled

General Consequentialism

Consequentialism is the belief that normative properties of an action are mostly (and in some cases, solely) dependent on the outcomes of such an action. This philosophical theory embraces what many individuals feel is a common and widely spread intuition about the moral rightness or wrongness of actions. Such an intuition, generally put, is the one that conceives that the morally relevant aspect to consider whether individuals should act in one way is the end result (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2023). As a consequence, elements such as the motivational set behind human action are regarded as directly or indirectly influencing a specific outcome while this latter concept remains at the centre of the moral analysis. This scope to moral assessment arrives at an unavoidable step in which possible alternatives are balanced. As it will be seen, consequentialist theories put such intuition in the abstract and, as if it were a mathematical calculation, attempt to present sound reasoning describing what a “good” consequence is. From this perspective, there is a distinction to be made, usually emphasised in moral philosophy, between what is good and what is right. Thus, the vast range of consequentialist theories might agree on identifying that the ‘right’ is equated with bringing about the best consequences, whereas those theories might disagree on specifying how those consequences should actually look. In other words, while consequentialist theories might agree on the idea of maximising good outcomes, they also might disagree regarding what a good outcome actually is, although this could not necessarily be the case. For this reason, this first section will assess the general description of consequentialism focusing on its understanding of the ‘right’ and the ‘good’, for which I will follow the ideas presented by David Brink (2007) and the priority over an understanding of value will be emphasised.

Figure 2: Vasile Kazar. Year Unknown. Untitled

Consequentialism can be understood as a set of moral theories that prioritise the concept of value, explaining other moral notions like duty or virtue in terms of promoting the former. For example, a consequentialist view of duty might define an agent’s duty as an action that promotes the good, while a consequentialist view of virtue might identify virtuous dispositions as those that lead to good outcomes. This framework can be applied to various objects of moral assessment, including actions, motives, individual lives, institutions, and moral codes (Brink, 2007). Being a consequentialist about any of these assessments means evaluating alternatives based on their comparative value. Consequentialism sees the good as primary and identifies right action as an action that promotes value, a philosophical stance that ought to be differentiated from other ethical theories, like deontology, that have as a main scope honouring values instead. The difference between both positions becomes essential in order to understand consequentialist perspectives. Promoting value focuses on actions that aim to maximise good outcomes, emphasising the results or consequences of actions. In contrast, honouring value involves recognising and respecting values or principles in themselves, regardless of the consequences, and adhering to moral duties or rules (Ibid). The previous entry of this series dealt with ethical theories of the second type. The difference between honouring and promoting has consequences for moral decision-making. Answering the question, how should I act? Will find a different answer depending on whether I intend to promote or honour a specific value. For instance, someone promoting value might lie to save a life because the outcome is more important than the act of lying, while someone honouring value would tell the truth even if it risks a life, upholding honesty as a fundamental principle. This is what makes promoting value outcome-oriented, whereas honouring value is principle-oriented as the primacy of holding up to principles outweighs the consequences of doing it or not. 

An important aspect of consequentialism that is relevant for the weighting of alternatives is its impersonal character. Impersonality in consequentialism is the principle that the moral rightness of an action is evaluated by considering the interests and well-being of all individuals affected equally, without preferential treatment for anyone, including the moral agents themselves. This agent-neutral perspective focuses on the overall consequences, aiming to maximise good. Utilitarianism exemplifies this principle, as it will be seen, by advocating actions that maximise overall happiness regardless of who benefits.

Finding a satisfying conception of what is valuable is not an easy task. In the case of consequentialism, this involves determining what has intrinsic value and what constitutes a good human life. One common view associated with consequentialism is hedonism, which claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain the only intrinsic evil (Ibid). Alternatively, the human good might be understood in terms of preference satisfaction, consisting of the satisfaction of actual or ideally informed desires. These views see the human good as dependent on an individual’s psychological state. In contrast, more objective theories might understand the good as the perfection of one’s essential capacities that could be associated with mental or rational abilities or as a list of objective goods. There are also questions about who the bearers of intrinsic good are, for example, whether all sentient creatures or only a specific class of beings, like humans or persons, questions that scape the scope of this article. 

Figure 3: Vasile Kazar. Year Unknown. Untitled

Arriving at a general description of consequentialism could be done through a different approach. Philip Pettit (1991), with the aim of giving a general and formal characterisation of consequentialism, emphasises two main relevant notions: the idea of an option and the one of a prognosis associated with an option (Pettit, 1991, p. 232). Behind this distinction is the idea that a strong emphasis must be paid to consequentialist views to justify the choice of one action over another. This necessarily must involve the assessment of the overall value of the consequences of an action in contrast with another. 

 An option can be a direct behavioural choice, such as doing an action X or an indirect one, like a commitment to a specific value. An option, Pettit says,  is defined as a possibility that the agent can choose to realise or not (Ibid). However, while an option can be realised, its outcome depends on various external factors. For example, choosing to do X might bring about unexpected events like harm to individuals or large-scale unwanted situations. Each option thus has different prognoses, which are the various ways the possibility can be realised. This concept goes in line with the familiar notion of a consequence. By paying attention to these concepts it arises that in consequentialism two main propositions are generally upheld: first, every prognosis for an option has a value determined by the valuable properties realised, even if the weighting of these properties isn't uniquely fixed. In other words, the value of the general action is calculated from the valuation of the properties of such action. Second, the value of an option is determined by the values of its prognoses, functioning as a combination of these values (Ibid, p. 232).

Consequentialists argue that promoting values means ranking the prognoses of options by these values and choosing options based on these rankings. This often involves calculating the expected value of an option as a gamble among different prognoses, using probabilities to weigh the outcomes. (Ibid) For example, if one option has a 50% chance of saving 100 lives and another guarantees saving 40 lives, the approach might favour the first option, assuming other factors are equal. Non-consequentialists assume agents can always know whether an option will honour a particular value. For instance, they believe it will always be clear if an action is respectful or loyal. However, this assumption isn't always practical, especially with values like happiness, which can be honoured by considering the direct happiness of others. Non-consequentialists often fail to provide guidance when none of the available options guarantees the relevant value, leaving such decisions undefined. This is particularly problematic when an option offers a chance of direct happiness, and another offers the best overall happiness prospect, leading to situations where the non-consequentialist response is unclear. 

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory advocating for actions that maximize overall happiness or utility, summarized as "the greatest good for the greatest number”, as described by one of its most emblematic figures John Stuart Mill (1861). Rooted in consequentialism, it evaluates the morality of actions based on their outcomes, with the principle of utility as its foundation. This principle dictates that actions should promote happiness and reduce suffering, considering each individual's well-being equally. Utilitarianism is divided into act utilitarianism, which assesses individual actions, and rule utilitarianism, which evaluates actions based on rules that maximise happiness if generally followed. To this distinction, it will be arrived at briefly. Influential thinkers like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill shaped the theory, with Bentham emphasising quantitative measures of pleasure and Mill introducing qualitative distinctions between higher and lower pleasures. utilitarianism remains influential, offering a framework for moral evaluation based on the consequences and overall impact on happiness.

Figure 4: Vasile Kazar. Year Unknown. Untitled

John Stuart Mill, one of the fathers of Utilitarianism, along with Jeremy Bentham, presents that he principle that bases morality should focus on Utility. The greatest happiness principle asserts that actions are right to the extent that they promote happiness and wrong to the extent that they produce the opposite of happiness (Mill, 1861). Happiness is defined as pleasure and the absence of pain, while unhappiness is defined as pain and the deprivation of pleasure. The fundamental premise of this theory can be summarised by saying that pleasure and the absence of pain are the only desirable ends. Consequently, all desirable things, which are just as numerous in utilitarianism as in any other moral framework, are desirable either for the pleasure they inherently provide or as a means to promote pleasure and prevent pain.

Regarding the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism, the thoughts of J. J. C. Smart will be followed (1973). Act utilitarianism contrasts with rule utilitarianism because in the latter the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the good or bad consequences of the action itself. In contrast, rule utilitarianism judges the rightness or wrongness of an action based on the goodness or badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone should follow in similar circumstances (Smart, 1973). 

Additionally, there is yet another distinction to be made in regard to utilitarianism. An act-utilitarian judges the rightness or wrongness of actions based on the goodness and badness of their consequences. However, defining the goodness or badness of a consequence does not have to be limited to its pleasantness.  Bentham (1961), for example, is classified as a hedonistic act utilitarian. This means that an important aspect for the calculation of the goodness of an outcome relates to the pleasantness it generates. In contrast, other philosophers think that certain states of mind, such as acquiring knowledge, have intrinsic value independent of their pleasantness (Smart, 1973) Mill occupied an intermediate position, holding that there are higher and lower pleasures, suggesting that while pleasure is necessary for goodness, goodness also depends on other qualities of experience besides pleasantness and unpleasantness.

Critiques

Opponents argue that consequentialist theories are misguided. Critics believe that certain values, for example, friendship, require us to perform certain favours for friends without impartially weighing our friends' welfare against that of strangers. Similarly, if I must choose between saving my drowning wife and saving a drowning stranger, it would be "one thought too many" to calculate the consequences of each action, as Bernard Williams (1981) depicts. According to him, one of the biggest faults of consequentialism lies in one of its biggest characteristics. According to Williams, utilitarianism faces significant issues due to the central role it assigns to the thesis which concerns impersonality (Williams, 1973). Although other moral systems, like Kantianism, are also impersonal, Williams notes that utilitarianism abstracts too much from the separateness of individuals (Williams, 1981). Unlike Kantianism, utilitarianism focuses on producing good consequences without considering the identity of the actor. It is solely concerned with ensuring that good consequences occur, William says, and it fails to provide a precise definition of what constitutes a consequence.

Figure 5: Vasile Kazar. Year Unknown. Untitled

Williams presents his critique of utilitarianism, focusing on this impersonal nature and abstract approach to moral action. He argues that utilitarianism, by prioritising the production of good consequences, neglects the individuality and separateness of persons (Ibid). Utilitarianism abstracts away from the question of who acts, focusing instead on the overall production of good outcomes. This focus on impersonal good undermines the moral significance of individual integrity and personal commitments. Williams believes that utilitarianism reduces individuals to mere instruments for achieving the greatest overall good, disregarding the importance of their personal projects and moral identities. Additionally, Williams critiques the utilitarian conception of consequences, arguing that utilitarianism fails to provide a clear and precise definition of what constitutes a consequence. A key aspect of Williams' critique is his concept of "moral integrity." He presents that utilitarianism demands individuals to act against their deeply held moral convictions if doing so would result in better overall consequences. This demand, Williams argues, threatens an individual's integrity by forcing them to betray their personal values and commitments. Williams also highlights the psychological impact of utilitarianism, suggesting that it imposes an unrealistic expectation on individuals to constantly calculate and maximize overall happiness. This expectation can lead to moral alienation, where individuals feel disconnected from their personal moral beliefs and emotions (Williams, 1973). 

In a similar position to Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) who criticises utilitarianism for its neglect of moral character and virtues, its ahistorical and culturally neutral stance, the fragmentation it induces in moral life, its reliance on instrumental reasoning, and its reductionist approach to ethics. He argues that utilitarianism's emphasis on calculating consequences overlooks the importance of cultivating virtuous character traits and fails to recognize the historical and cultural contexts that shape moral understanding.

Figure 6: Vasile Kazar. Year Unknown. Untitled

Consequentialism stands as a comprehensive moral framework that emphasises the outcomes of actions as the primary determinant of their ethical value. Rooted in the widely held intuition that the morality of actions should be judged by their results, consequentialism seeks to provide a systematic method for assessing what constitutes a "good" consequence, thereby distinguishing itself from other ethical theories such as deontology. By prioritizing value, consequentialism explains moral notions like duty and virtue in terms of promoting good outcomes, applying this evaluative lens to various aspects of moral assessment. Despite its appeal, consequentialism faces significant criticisms, particularly its impersonal nature, which can undermine personal integrity and lead to morally alienating decision-making processes. Prominent critiques, such as those by Bernard Williams, argue that consequentialism's focus on impersonal good and overall outcomes neglects the importance of individual moral commitments and the separateness of persons. Nevertheless, consequentialism, particularly through utilitarianism, continues to influence ethical discourse by providing a robust framework for evaluating actions based on their potential to maximise overall happiness or utility.

Bibliographical References

Bentham, J., (1961) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Garden City: Doubleday. Originally published in 1789.

Brink, D. O. (2007). Some forms and limits of consequentialism. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of ethical theory (Oxford Handbooks; online ed., Oxford Academic, 2 Sept. 2009). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325911.003.0015 

MacIntyre, A. (1984) After Virtue, Notre-Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2nd edition

Mill, J. S., 1861. Utilitarianism, edited with an introduction by Roger Crisp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Pettit, P. (1991). Consequentialism. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics (pp. 230–240). Oxford: Blackwell.

Singer, P. (1979). Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consequentialism/>. 

Smart, J. J. C (1973) An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics in In J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, in Utilitarianism: For and against (pp. 3–74). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Williams, B. (1973). A critique of utilitarianism. In J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, in Utilitarianism: For and against (pp. 77–150). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, B. (1981) Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Visual Sources

Cover Image: Kazar, V. Year Unknown. Untitled. Images retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/vasile-kazar/all-works#!#filterName:all-paintings-chronologically,resultType:masonry 

Figure 1 - 6: Kazar, V. Year Unknown. Untitled. Images retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/vasile-kazar/all-works#!#filterName:all-paintings-chronologically,resultType:masonry