Ethics Series: Virtue Over Goodness
Foreword
Questions like “Why be moral?” or “What do we mean when we say something or someone is morally bad?” have been protractedly debated within the philosophical tradition. This series gives an overview of the traditional and contemporary discussion on the topic of Ethics and morality by focusing on the philosophical foundations of the moral phenomenon and the most relevant schools of thought trying to answer the question: “What should I do?”. Whether in assessing other people’s actions or our own, moral questions are part of our daily lives; their answers shape how we behave and expect others to behave. Thus, giving a philosophical and systematic answer to these questions gains relevance beyond the mere sphere of academic circles. The series explores how the moral question is not just about “good” or “bad” but also about what type of life we want to live and how we advocate for a world that reflects such life choices. The articles will present arguments for and against different schools of thought, showing different ways of behaving and thinking in everyday life according to those theories. Readers are expected to interiorize terminology and the conceptual depth of the development of ethical theory.
Ethics Series is divided into six articles:
Ethics Series: Virtue Over Goodness
Virtue ethics is a branch of moral philosophy that focuses on the importance of character and virtues in making moral decisions, rather than relying on rules or outcomes. The two previous entries of this series have emphasised these philosophical positions. While Deontology focuses on the presentation of rules as parameters for the rightness of moral action, Consequentialism assesses the consequences of such action to determine its rightness. Nevertheless, virtue ethics, an alternative to these two philosophical theories, denies that rules or consequences are what matters when it comes to establishing moral action principles. In what follows, this article will present two main core ideas about virtue ethics and the different forms of this philosophical theory. First, attention will be paid to the concept of Eudaimonia, relevant to the origins of virtue ethics. Second, it presents a form of virtue ethics focused on the role of the agent performing the moral action. Third, this article will develop the idea of virtue ethics as focusing on the object towards which the action is directed. Finally, this article will present possible objections to virtue ethics.
An important philosopher for the modern development of virtue ethics is G. E. M. Anscombe (1958), who revived the modern interest in virtue theory in the middle of the 20th century. In her work, she holds three main theses. Initially, Anscombe presents that moral philosophy, due to the lack of a robust philosophy of psychology during the first half of the 20th century, was futile. She argued that without a comprehensive understanding of concepts such as action and intention, moral theorizing remains premature and ineffective. As a consequence, Anscombe's critique extends to the conventional moral vocabulary, leading her to her second thesis and urging philosophers to abandon notions like moral obligation and duty, which she posits are coherent only within a framework of divine command theory. Her third thesis consists of a criticism of consequentialist ethical theories, particularly their treatment of intention and responsibility. She argues that consequentialism, based on flawed premises regarding action and foresight, leads to problematic moral conclusions, such as justifying actions like killing innocents under certain circumstances. Her virtue ethics focuses on cultivating virtuous character traits as central to moral philosophy. She emphasizes that ethical behaviour flows naturally from possessing virtues rather than adhering to rules or principles. Virtues like honesty, courage, and justice, according to Anscombe, are not just meant to achieve good outcomes but intrinsic goods in themselves, shaping one's character and guiding actions in morally commendable ways. Central to her virtue ethics is the notion of how to properly discern the right course of action in particular situations through a deep understanding of ethical principles and a sensitivity to context.
Before entering into the divisions found in the approaches of virtue ethics, it is relevant to clarify the concepts of virtue and practical wisdom. According to Rosalind Hursthouse (2022) virtue is conceived in the context of virtue ethics as an “excellent trait of character” (Hursthouse, 2022, p. 2) that is deeply rooted in its possessor, influencing how they notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in characteristic ways. Possessing a virtue means being a particular kind of person with a complex mindset, where a significant aspect is the wholehearted acceptance of a range of considerations as reasons for action. For example, an honest person's actions and choices regarding honesty reflect their views on honesty, truth, and deception. Such values influence other aspects of their life, such as preferring to work with honest people, valuing honest friends, and teaching their children to be honest. They disapprove of dishonesty, are not amused by deceit, and either despise or pity those who succeed through deception. Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. Perfect virtue, which is rare, involves fully possessing such a disposition, but many fall short of this ideal (Ibid). Regarding this, Neera Badhwar (1996) criticises the notion that virtues form a unified whole and challenges the idea that possessing one virtue necessarily implies possessing others. She argues that virtues are distinct qualities that can exist independently and manifest selectively depending on contextual factors. She says that virtues are not universally interconnected but rather arise situationally based on personal judgment and circumstances. The concept of practical wisdom, or phronesis, as discussed in ancient Greece by Aristotle, is the ability to make sound judgments and decisions in real-life situations. It involves understanding how to act rightly and effectively in various contexts, balancing moral principles with practical considerations
In this context, the development of virtue ethics, and therefore of virtue theory as the study of the exhibited virtues in moral action, has presented different perspectives depending on how the two previously presented concepts are conceived. The first version of virtue ethics to be evaluated is the one that emphasises the Greek concept of Eudaimonia. Eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics distinguish themselves by defining virtues in relation to eudaimonia, sometimes translated as "happiness," "flourishing," or "well-being". This concept refers to the idea of living a fulfilled, flourishing life through virtuous activity and ethical conduct, grounded in an objective understanding of human excellence and well-being. As previously mentioned, this approach to virtue ethics is derived from the thought of Aristotle, which will roughly be presented as it represents some seminal thoughts. Aristotle believed that the best life for humans is not merely subjective but can be objectively determined through careful reflection on specific criteria. A life guided by reason fulfils these criteria uniquely, promoting it as superior. This life, according to Aristotle, meets several conditions: it is pursued for its own sake, desired for itself, complete, and self-sufficient. He argued that eudaimonia involves virtuous activity, encompassing moral and intellectual excellences, which are necessary for true human flourishing. To make full sense of his thought it is important to mention that Aristotle’s ideas extend into political theory, viewing the polis (city-state) as crucial to realizing human flourishing collectively (Shields, 2020). He posits that humans are inherently political beings who thrive within organized societies that facilitate their best interests. Aristotle contrasts various forms of government based on the number and virtue of rulers, distinguishing correct forms from deviant ones based on their ability to promote human flourishing. He advocates for a just state that distributes goods and honours according to merit, rejecting extremes like oligarchy's bias towards the wealthy and democracy's indiscriminate pursuit of equality. Ultimately, Aristotle's political naturalism asserts that the polis should support and enhance human flourishing, ideally through a mixed constitution that balances liberty with meritocratic principles.
For eudaimonists, then, virtue is a characteristic that either contributes to or is an essential component of eudaimonia. Unlike subjective happiness, eudaimonia encompasses a morally informed concept of genuine fulfilment. Eudaimonia is not simply a state but a state of living well as a human being, involving a life enriched by virtue rather than mere pleasure or material gain. While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is integral to eudaimonia, various interpretations exist regarding the relationship between virtue and additional factors contributing to a flourishing life. According to Mark LeBar (2013) achieving eudaimonia requires cultivating virtues that contribute to both personal fulfilment and moral excellence, being a comprehensive and objective standard of well-being essential to ethical living. He critiques subjective theories of well-being that reduce eudaimonia to mere subjective satisfaction, advocating instead for an understanding rooted in human nature and the pursuit of excellence. He also emphasizes the ethical significance of eudaimonia, saying that living well involves not only personal happiness but also the development of virtues and engagement in activities that promote individual and communal flourishing.
In contrast with eudaimonist approaches, agent-based virtue ethics accentuates the role of an agent's character and virtues rather than prioritizing rules or consequences. It diverges from the previously presented approach as it sees the source of norms as being ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (Hursthouse, 2022). This approach highlights the importance of cultivating virtuous traits such as honesty, courage, justice, and compassion, positioning moral character at the core of ethical deliberation and action. Agent-based virtue ethics emphasizes the ongoing ethical development of individuals and advocates for the integration of virtues into one's character through habitual practice and reflective engagement. A proponent of this type of virtue ethics is Linda Zagzebski (2017) who proposes a distinctive approach within virtue ethics that centres on the concept of exemplars, i.e. individuals who embody virtuous traits and serve as models for ethical behaviour. Her theory states that moral understanding and development are fundamentally shaped by our encounters with these exemplars. Zagzebski emphasizes the importance of concrete, exemplary individuals whose actions and character traits we admire and seek to emulate. By observing and reflecting on their actions and character traits, we develop a deeper understanding of what it means to act morally and virtuously. Our moral judgments, she says, are influenced by our emotional responses to exemplars. Thus we feel admiration for virtuous actions and disapproval of vicious actions. This emotional engagement with exemplars guides our moral development and shapes our moral motivations.
Eudaimonist virtue ethicists anchor their ethical framework on a flourishing human life, whereas agent-based virtue ethicists focus on the motivations of exemplary agents. In contrast, another approach, the one presented by Christine Swanton (2003), starts from our intuitive understanding of virtues already recognized as such. Rather than reducing ethics to imitable motivations or expanding it to encompass a completely flourishing life, target-centred virtue ethics begins where most ethics learners begin from already endorsed virtues in order to make a deeper assessment of the specifics of these virtues. By focusing on their scope, responsiveness, moral basis, and objectives this approach gives an assessment of the virtues themselves. Each virtue pertains to a distinct domain, responds to specific moral cues, operates uniquely in its mode of response, and aims at particular outcomes. According to Swanton, a virtue is characterized as a disposition to respond appropriately within its domain, while a virtuous action is one that effectively meets the objectives of its corresponding virtue. Defining right action within this framework requires navigating situations where multiple virtues may conflict, which the target-centred view addresses in three ways: a perfectionist approach identifying right actions as the best possible in the circumstances, a more flexible stance accepting actions that are good enough, or a minimalist stance considering actions right as long as they avoid outright vice. Rather than prescribing a single overarching criterion for ethical behaviour, Swanton highlights the diversity within virtue ethics. She argues that virtues are characterized by their particular domains of application, their modes of responsiveness to moral challenges, the basis on which they acknowledge moral goods, and the specific objectives or targets they aim to achieve. Her approach emphasizes the practical and contextual nature of ethical decision-making. It is concerned not only with defining virtues abstractly but also with understanding how virtues operate in real-life moral dilemmas where multiple virtues may come into play and sometimes conflict. This pluralistic perspective allows for a nuanced exploration of moral character and ethical action without reducing ethics to a single principle or criterion.
Virtue ethics has encountered several objections that critique its ability to provide a robust framework for moral philosophy. These objections highlight concerns ranging from practical application to theoretical adequacy and philosophical coherence. There are, as enumerated by Hursthouse, eight major objections: application, adequacy, relativism, conflict, self-effacement, justification, egoism, and the situationist challenge. Firstly, the application problem criticises virtue ethics for its supposed inability to offer codifiable principles that provide clear action guidance in moral decision-making. Historically, the resurging of virtue ethics emerged in contrast to deontological and utilitarian theories, which aimed to establish universal rules or principles applicable to all moral situations. As it has been already shown, virtue ethicists argue that moral discernment requires more than rule-following; it demands phronesis, or practical wisdom, which integrates moral virtues into contextual judgments (Anscombe, 1958). Critics initially misunderstood virtue ethics as primarily concerned with character traits rather than actions, wrongly assuming it lacked action-guiding principles. However, virtue ethicists have developed “virtue rules” such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse, 1999), which provide practical guidance rooted in virtues and vices.
Regarding the questions on adequacy, the issue is whether virtue ethics can adequately define what constitutes morally right action. Some critics argue that virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for determining the rightness or wrongness of actions, thereby challenging virtue ethics’ claim to define morality solely in terms of virtues and vices. However, proponents of virtue ethics, following Anscombe, suggest that focusing on “right action” may be misguided. They propose addressing how one should live and what virtues one should cultivate, rather than reducing all moral judgments to the concept of rightness or wrongness. The critique about purported relativism challenges virtue ethics on grounds of cultural diversity. Critics argue that different cultures uphold different virtues, suggesting that virtue ethics’ rules may only define right or wrong actions relative to specific cultural contexts (MacIntyre, 1985). In response, virtue ethicists argue that while cultures may differ in their specific manifestations of virtues, the virtues themselves are grounded in universal human goods such as flourishing and well-being. They contend that virtue ethics can accommodate cultural diversity without reducing morality to cultural relativism. The conflict problem raises dilemmas where different virtues appear to prescribe conflicting courses of action. For instance, charity might conflict with justice or honesty with compassion. Virtue ethicists acknowledge these dilemmas but argue that practical wisdom allows for nuanced judgments that prioritize virtues appropriately in specific situations. They contend that conflicts between virtues are not unique to virtue ethics but are inherent in ethical decision-making across different normative theories.
The self-effacement objection questions whether the motive for virtuous action should be the virtue itself. Critics argue that attributing actions to virtuous motives might undermine the altruistic nature of those actions. Virtue ethicists respond by distinguishing between self-interested motives and motives grounded in virtue. They argue that virtuous actions are motivated by a recognition of what is morally good, rather than by self-serving desires, thereby maintaining the ethical integrity of virtuous conduct.
The justification problem challenges virtue ethics to provide a foundational basis for its claims about virtues. This metaethical concern questions how virtue ethicists justify their assertions regarding which character traits constitute virtues. Unlike deontologists and utilitarians who seek external foundations for their ethical theories, virtue ethicists often adopt coherentist approaches or ethical naturalism, arguing that virtues can be validated through their coherence with human flourishing and well-being.
The egoism objection accuses virtue ethics of promoting selfishness, arguing that acting virtuously aligns with one’s desires and thus lacks genuine moral altruism. Virtue ethicists reject this view, explaining that virtuous actions are motivated by a genuine concern for the well-being of others and the pursuit of human flourishing. They argue that virtues like generosity and courage inherently involve acting contrary to self-interest when necessary (Foot, 2001).
Finally, the situationist challenge questions the existence of stable character traits that underpin virtue ethics. Social psychology studies suggest that behaviour is heavily influenced by situational factors rather than stable character traits. Virtue ethicists respond by emphasizing the nuanced nature of virtues as multi-track dispositions that encompass a range of behaviours across different contexts. They argue that empirical studies do not undermine the concept of virtues but instead highlight the complexity of moral psychology and the need for nuanced ethical theories. Virtue ethics offers a unique and compelling perspective on moral philosophy, focusing on the cultivation of virtuous character traits rather than strict adherence to rules or outcome-based calculations. This approach promotes a holistic and context-sensitive form of ethical reasoning, emphasizing the development of virtues that foster human flourishing and well-being. At the heart of this framework is the concept of Eudaimonia, highlighting the importance of living a life enriched by virtue rather than mere pleasure or material gain. Revived notably by G. E. M. Anscombe, virtue ethics has challenged the predominance of deontological and consequentialist theories by critiquing their dependence on abstract principles and outcomes. Anscombe's focus on moral psychology and practical wisdom underscores the need for a deeper comprehension of ethical behaviour that transcends rule-following or outcome-based judgments.
Despite encountering significant objections, such as those related to application, adequacy, relativism, and the situationist challenge, virtue ethics provides strong responses that highlight the nuanced nature of moral decision-making. By integrating practical wisdom and contextual judgment, virtue ethicists argue that their approach better addresses the complexity of real-life ethical dilemmas compared to more rigid theoretical frameworks. Moreover, virtue ethics' emphasis on character development offers a more personal and transformative vision of morality, where ethical living involves the continuous cultivation of virtues like honesty, courage, and compassion. This perspective not only guides individuals in their moral decisions but also inspires them to strive for higher standards of character and integrity. Ultimately, virtue ethics calls for a reevaluation of our approach to moral philosophy, advocating for a shift towards a more integrated and humane understanding of ethics. By stressing the intrinsic value of virtues and their role in achieving a flourishing life, virtue ethics presents a profound and lasting vision of what it means to live well and act rightly. This approach, while not without its challenges, continues to offer valuable insights and directions for contemporary moral philosophy, enriching our understanding of ethical life.
Bibliographical References
Aristotle. (2000). Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) (R. Crisp, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Badhwar, N. (1996).The Limited Unity of Virtue, Noûs, 30: 306–29.
Foot, P. (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hursthouse, R., & Pettigrove, G. (2023). Virtue ethics. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/ethics-virtue/
Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
LeBar, M. (2013). The Value of Living Well. New York: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1985). After Virtue (2nd ed.). London: Duckworth.
Shields, C. (2023). Aristotle. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/aristotle/
Swanton, C. (2003). Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2017). Exemplarist Moral Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
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