Extending the Boundaries of Democracy by Rethinking Inclusion and Participation

Introduction

The fundamental understanding of democracy involves some form of rule by the people, whether through elections or more direct means. In adopting this principle, certain groups tend to be excluded. Some exclusions can be normatively justified, such as the exclusion of children and the mentally ill due to their lack of autonomous self-agency (Beckman, 2009). These cases involve individuals presumed to lack the mental capacity to understand and engage in the most basic democratic processes. However, in most cases, the boundaries of the demos are determined by the concept of citizenship as the minimum requirement for participation (Beckman, 2006). Despite its central role, citizenship is an arbitrary concept subject to various interpretations, which fails to satisfy any reasonable normative basis for defining the demos and electoral participation (Beckman, 2006).

Various schools of thought address this unreasonable boundary of citizenship and propose alternative solutions. The most prominent among them are the all-affected principle and its legal derivative, the all-subjected principle. These principles challenge the restrictive definitions of the demos imposed by the citizenship principle and seek to establish a more inclusive and democratic approach to determining who gets to vote (Beckman, 2009; Erman, 2018; Goodin, 2007). This article examines these principles and assesses how they correspond to different conceptualizations of democracy.

Figure 1: Tories Out Demonstration in London (2019). Brexit Spotlight.

What is democracy?

The boundary problem cannot be examined without first establishing an understanding of democracy as a concept. Defining the demos is, in fact, a prerequisite for the existence of democracy itself (Goodin, 2007). Moreover, determining the boundaries of equal suffrage depends significantly on different conceptualizations of democracy (Beckman, 2009). While the basic understanding holds that “the suffrage is more ‘democratic’ the more members of the association it includes” (Beckman, 2009, p. 35), different conceptualizations lead to varying interpretations of inclusion and its boundaries. Conventionally, democracy is conceptualized through two main approaches—maximalist and minimalist—based on the number of criteria a regime must fulfill to be considered democratic (Beckman, 2009).

The minimalist conception corresponds to the ideal of electoral democracy, in which the sole requirement for democracy is an election that ensures a peaceful transition of power between rulers (Przeworski, 1999). From this definition, two fundamental elements emerge: a peaceful transition and competitive elections. Even in the contemporary context, the achievement of peaceful transitions and electorally legitimized rulers remains a significant milestone and a cornerstone of democracy (Przeworski, 1999). Notably, the minimalist conception does not impose inclusion requirements, making normative considerations of inclusivity irrelevant. Its core idea is that elections produce results accepted by both winners, and losers and as long as the next elections are held on time, the demands of democracy are met (Przeworski, 1999). Consequently, in this conception, defining the demos and its boundaries is unnecessary.

The alternative conceptualization is the maximalist approach to democracy. Building upon the fundamental requirements of competitive elections and peaceful transitions, this approach incorporates additional elements. One such element is equality, defined as ensuring that everyone is treated as an equal participant in the democratic process and perceives themselves as being treated equally (Christiano, 2022). Another crucial dimension is inclusion, which emphasizes that the boundaries of the demos should be as broad as possible (Dahl, 1989). This conceptualization explicitly requires a regime not only to hold elections and facilitate a peaceful transfer of power but also to be inclusive, promote democratic participation, and uphold the principle of equal treatment for all.

Figure 2: Presidential Inauguration of Barack Obama (2009) by Jack Brewer. Flickr.

The minimalist conceptualization is often considered more appealing due to its simplicity and straightforward nature. The binary approach that typically accompanies this conception of democracy aligns with the basic requirements met by most contemporary democracies. In contrast, the maximalist conceptualization imposes additional demands that many existing democracies fail to meet (Beckman, 2009). To more effectively assess alternatives to citizenship-based exclusions, this research will adopt the maximalist approach. This choice is justified by the maximalist model’s strong emphasis on inclusion and equality, which are central to the examination of democratic participation and the boundaries of the demos.

The all-affected principle

If a decision and its decision-makers seek democratic legitimacy, that legitimacy should be derived from all those affected by that decision. This forms the core argument of the all-affected principle, which asserts that everyone impacted by a decision should have the right to participate in its making (Beckman, 2009). As a result, this principle is inherently egalitarian (Goodin, 2007). It challenges the citizenship model by advocating for the broadest possible definition of the demos. In its purest form, the all-affected principle envisions a model of global democracy that transcends national borders (Goodin, 2007). For example, if a power plant is planned for construction in country X along a river that also flows through country Y, the citizens of both countries should be included in the decision-making process.

While the all-affected principle has a strong normative appeal in terms of inclusion, it is also highly impractical. One key challenge is that the principle presupposes including only those who are genuinely affected (Goodin, 2007). Nevertheless, accurately determining who is affected by a given decision remains a significant challenge (Goodin, 2007). Returning to the previous example, one might assume that only individuals residing along the riverbanks in both countries should be consulted. Yet, some of these individuals might not be directly impacted by changes to the river’s flow, while others who do not live on the banks but rely on the river for their livelihood may experience significant consequences.

Figure 3: Ballot Box (2020) by Sora Shimazaki. Pexels.

A practical solution to these issues might involve limiting the scope of the all-affected principle by restricting decision-making power (Goodin, 2007) or developing a stakeholder model (Beckman, 2009). On the one hand, restricting decision-making power and assigning an advisory role to a body that adheres to the all-affected principle could mitigate legitimacy damage arising from excluding relevant individuals or including those who are irrelevant (Goodin, 2007). However, this would also diminish the normative strength of the all-affected principle, undermining its original goal of addressing the arbitrary nature of current boundaries to inclusion. On the other hand, the stakeholder model suggests that only those with a direct and tangible stake in the decision—such as fishers or boat-rental companies in the river example—should be considered (Beckman, 2009). This approach also presents several challenges. First, defining the stakeholder structure is challenging because of the interconnectedness of modern societies, where various groups are impacted in complex ways. Second, the stakeholders are not fixed; for instance, current fishers on the river are making decisions that will affect others, including future generations or new stakeholders who may emerge as the river's usage evolves.

Despite these complications, the central practical issue that remains unresolved is that the primary framework still operates within nation-states. The all-affected principle, in our global and interconnected world, necessitates a shift toward global forms of democracy (Goodin, 2007). Referring back to the power plant example, even if all individuals affected by changes to the river’s flow and banks are consulted, the actual implementation and enforcement of the decision are only feasible within the state framework. If State X chooses to build a power plant on its portion of the river, state Y lacks mechanisms to intervene and protect its interests. Therefore, while the all-affected principle provides a compelling theoretical foundation for transcending the current boundaries of the demos, it faces numerous practical challenges, with the nation-state framework being the most significant.

The all-subjected principle

A viable solution to the nation-state problem related to the all-affected principle may lie in its legalistic derivative, the all-subjected principle. The core assumption of this approach is that individuals should have an influence only over decisions to which they are legally bound (Beckman, 2009). In this context, “the legal interpretation of the all-affected principle envisions all legal subjects as members of the democratic people” (Beckman, 2009, p. 47). This principle shifts the focus from the complexity of determining who might or might not be affected to the scope of the government’s authority (Beckman, 2009). In doing so, it offers a more coherent approach to addressing the arbitrariness of the citizenship model, while preserving inclusion as the central aim of democracy and adapting to the limitations imposed by the nation-state framework (Beckman, 2009).

Figure 4: Polling Station (2012). Flickr.

The legalistic approach to the boundary problem enhances democratic values by emphasizing self-governance, understood as individual autonomy and the right to choose which laws to support, which is another core tenet of democratic ideals (Dahl, 1989). Accordingly, the foundation of the all-subjected principle affords a measure of democratic autonomy by presupposing that individuals should only be obliged to comply with laws to which they have contributed or which they have effectively shaped (Erman, 2018). This principle thus strengthens the legitimacy of the legal system and the state's coercive power over its citizens.

Despite representing a significant leap toward practicality compared to the pure all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle still has certain shortcomings that need to be addressed. Even within the maximalist approach to democracy, the electoral procedure remains foundational. Indeed, democratic systems are typically grounded in the electoral ideal (Przeworski, 1999), meaning that voting grants authority to the elected representatives and temporarily suspends individual autonomy until the next election (Przeworski, 1999). This creates additional challenges for the principle. For instance, if an international student moves to country X to pursue a master’s program, they are subject to the country’s laws and should be eligible to vote. However, if that student votes and then leaves the country midway through the electoral mandate, they become over-represented for the remainder of the mandate. Conversely, if the student arrives in country X during the middle of the mandate, they are under-represented, even though the laws of the country bind them. This admittedly simplified example illustrates that even the all-subjected principle raises practical questions when applied within a purely electoral democratic framework.

Nevertheless, mechanisms of participatory democracy may be more aligned with the all-subjected principle. While self-autonomy remains suspended between elections in electoral democracy (Przeworski, 1999), a constantly active citizenry is essential for participatory democracy (Pateman, 2012). The all-subjected principle advocates for the inclusion of all individuals who are bound by decisions in the decision-making process (Beckman, 2009), which closely aligns with the ideal of participatory democracy, where individuals regularly participate in shaping social and political choices. Thus, the core assumptions of participatory democracy correspond to those of the all-subjected principle, as both allow individuals to engage in the creation of laws to which they are subsequently bound. In contrast, electoral democracy presupposes a limited set of potential policies presented by candidates, while a significant portion of decisions are contingent on unpredictable circumstances. In other words, it is impossible to predict in advance which issues and laws will be debated and adopted by the government during the time between elections.

Figure 5: DC Vigil for Democracy (2022) by Elvert Barnes. Wikimedia Commons.

Even though participatory democracy encompasses various forms of participation, referendums are often the most common means of increasing citizen involvement (Cheneval et al., 2018). The referendum mechanism is also the most practical way to implement the all-subjected principle. In the case of building a power plant on a river, a referendum would allow a defined demo to decide whether or not to proceed with the construction, ensuring that individuals have both self-autonomy and a clear understanding of what is being decided. This provides a practical example of how the normative desires for inclusion and self-autonomy can be fulfilled within a democratic framework.

Conclusion

The all-affected principle holds significant normative democratic value, particularly in terms of equality, but it comes with a range of practical shortcomings. In contrast, the all-subjected principle closely aligns with the central claim of the all-affected principle, while offering a more pragmatic understanding that acknowledges the prevalence of the nation-state over any ideal of global democracy. However, both approaches appear impractical within the framework of pure electoral democracy. This misfit is not necessarily an argument against these principles but rather an argument against the limitations of electoral democracy itself. Therefore, the main argument of this article is that striving for a maximalist approach to democracy involves extending the boundaries of the electorate and making democracy more participatory. While most existing democracies remain predominantly electoral, it is clear why the all-affected and all-subjected principles, alongside the ideal of participatory democracy, carry stronger normative values.

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Visual References