Gyorgy Lukács: Labour as The Foundation of The Social
The ontological project of Gyorgy Lukács, strongly founded on Hegelian philosophy and materialist Marxism, aims to sustain, among other things, that the foundation of the social world lies in the activity of labour [Arbeit]. Lukács’ assessment of labour as the origin of the social dimension of man in its role as an “original phenomenon” grounds human activity and development in a way that differentiates it from any other being. For this, he adopts terminology from some of his philosophical predecessors and gives them new meanings in light of his understanding of materialism and the nature of reality. As a consequence of his adoption of a Hegelian and Marxist framework, Lukács conceives labour as an “original phenomenon” from which all other social phenomena derive. In order to explain the importance of labour for Lukács we will follow The Ontology of Social Being, one of his prime works. The specific element to be analyzed in this article will be labour in terms of teleological positing.
Labour and Teleological Positing
Before starting the exposition, the concept of teleological positing must be clarified. For Lukács, teleological positing involves individuals and social classes consciously directing their actions towards specific goals within the dialectical process of history. The concept highlights the significance of human agency and purpose in shaping its own development as it goes along in a historical context. Thus, teleological positing is understood as a phenomenon in which humanity controls and adapts nature in order to materialise specific goals found in consciousness. From this perspective, his materialistic philosophical background, against any transcendental or religious interpretation of reality, regards that the only real end goal found in nature is the one that is presented in human consciousness and that is purposefully materialised. This general concept is borrowed from the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel. Within Hegel’s philosophical framework, the role of labour is paramount. He recognized the role of labour as a primary instance of teleological positing and a locus for freedom. In Hegel's philosophy, labour plays a crucial role in the development of human consciousness and self-realization. For Hegel, labour is not merely a means of survival or production but rather a fundamental activity through which individuals engage with the external world, transform it and thereby realize their own potential and freedom. Labour emerges in Hegel as a sign of humanity's increasing recognition of its confrontation with and distinction from nature. As the property is established, it formalizes human relations by assimilating the objective world into consciousness, integrating nature into human history (Avineri, 1971). Similarly, labour signifies the evolution of desires from initially destructive to constructive engagement with the objective world. While primitive humans and animals consume and destroy nature, labour presents an object of desire not through negation but through creation. Put in these terms, labour has a characteristically formative element in it, a uniquely human characteristic that allows for the transformation of nature and the formation of something new. Regarding this, Hegel specifies that this “formative” characteristic is varied. He says:
In empirical contexts, this giving of form may assume the most varied shapes. The field which I cultivate is hereby given form. As far as the inorganic realm is concerned, I do not always give it form directly. If, for example, I build a windmill, I have not given form to the air, but I have constructed a form in order to utilize the air. . . . Even the fact that I conserve game may be regarded as a way of imparting form, for it is a mode of conduct calculated to preserve the object in question. The training of animals is, of course, a more direct way of giving them form, and I play a greater role in this process. (Hegel, 1991, §56A, 86.)
Lukács, in the third volume of his Ontology, directly refers to the Hegelian and Marxist influence of his view on labour. In order to give a concrete and material explanation of labour, Lukács presents and justifies the uniqueness of this phenomenon. As the differentiation made by Marx before him, Lukács acknowledges, thus recognizing the intentional character of this act, that there is a stark difference between the act of human labour and what could be counted as its animal counterpart. The human act of labour is not biologically rooted, meaning that it is not a mere mode of adaptation of the species to its environment. More than that, the act of labour is able to produce its own conditions of reproduction, conditions always “determined by the structure of the society of the time, and not the biological properties of its members.” (Ontology 3, p. 2-3). Through labour, Lukács says, a particular interaction between the human mind and matter occurs a process that gives rise to a new type of objectivity, i.e. the social world. Labour becomes the original phenomenon of any social practice. It becomes its genesis. This is so because teleological positing, with the involvement of consciousness and matter, starts a new process that is separated, although not totally, from the causal connections found in reality. In nature, the chain of causality operates automatically, following its inherent necessity of cause and consequence. In labour, however, not only is the goal teleologically posited, but the causal chain to achieve it must also be transformed into a posited causality (Ibid, p. 33). Both the means and the object of labour are inherently natural things subject to natural causality and it is only through teleological positing that they acquire the characteristics of social existence within the labour process, even though they remain natural objects. This view presents labour not as just one instance of teleological positing, but the only real dynamic in which this occurs because, by being distinct and separate from causality, it constitutes its own path into the development of the being. Lukács attributes this important acknowledgment to Marx when he says:
Marx's understanding of labour teleology already goes far beyond the attempted solutions of even such great predecessors as Aristotle and Hegel, since for Marx labour is not one of the many phenomenal forms of teleology in general, but rather the only point at which a teleological positing can be ontologically established as a real moment of material actuality (Ontology 3, p. 8)
For Lukács, Marx's precise and strictly defined restriction of teleology to labour (or to social practice), while excluding it from all other modes of being, enhances its significance. This understanding reveals that teleology is a distinctive and defining feature. It shows that the social being, through labour, transcends its foundational level of organic life and attains a new, autonomous form of existence characterized by purposeful and goal-directed activity (ibid). With the presentation of labour as having an ontological character Lukács explicitly states, something not done by Marx, that the real motor of historical progress has an ontological character and that it is the means through which organic being can become fully human (Infranca et al., 2019). For both Marx and Lukács, the goal established in labour represents the point at which the ideal becomes a fundamental component of social-material reality, influencing the causal sequence of determinations of being (ibid). Parallely, as Michael Thompson (2019) describes, the social being is embedded within a broader ontology of material reality, not determined by material reality in a mechanistic sense. According to him, Lukács seeks to explore how subjective agency transforms the material world and how this transformative activity is central to social reality and the articulation of social forms. Moreover, his premise is that the capacity for intentional activity is a fundamental power that distinguishes humans as a species (Ibid).
In order to properly understand labour, Lukács says, it is important to recognize how two completely opposite categories interact with each other. For this, we have to consider the two acts involved in the process of labour, i.e. the positing of the goal and the investigation of the means (Ibid, p. 11). The categories of causality and teleology come together in the act of labour as the investigation of the means to achieve a posited goal requires an objective understanding of how to initiate the necessary processes and conditions. Teleology and causality are heterogeneous principles that together form the ontological foundation of certain complexes of motion. Despite their contradictions, they coexist inseparably and are only ontologically possible within the realm of social being. Their effectiveness within this realm produces the major characteristic of this level of being. Thus, the positing of the goal and the exploration of methods do not create anything new, as natural reality must remain as a system of complexes governed by unchanging laws governed by causality, indifferent to human efforts and ideas. The investigation has a dual function: it reveals what is happening independently of human consciousness in the objects being studied, and it identifies new combinations and functional possibilities within these objects that can be activated to achieve the goal (Ontology 3, 1971). For example, objects can only serve a specified function if their existing properties allow for such a use, as would be the case of wood and the construction of a house. As a consequence of this, Lukács establishes that the realizability of a goal is strictly dependent on the knowledge of nature we possess. At this point, he highlights the further implication: with labour, human consciousness ceases to be merely an epiphenomenon in the ontological sense (Ibid, p. 21), an aspect that will be further analyzed in the following section. Only through labour, by setting a goal and determining the means to achieve it, does consciousness elevate itself through a self-directed act beyond mere adaptation to the environment. This contrasts with animal activities that, while they may change nature, do so without deliberate intention. Human labour initiates changes in nature that are exclusive to human intervention. As realization becomes a transformative and creative force in nature, the consciousness that drives and guides this process can no longer be considered merely an ontological epiphenomenon. For Lukács, while animal consciousness is an undeniable reality, it remains a limited aspect that serves the biologically driven reproduction process, which follows biological laws. Human consciousness escapes this dynamic and through the process of labour gives rise to a new reality. This positions consciousness and the subject as a central element of the process of labour. About this Lukács says:
If we conceive labour in its essential original –nature as the producer of use-values– as an 'eternal' form that persists through the change in social formations, ie., the metabolism between man (society) and nature, it is then clear that the intention that defines the character of the alternative is directed towards a change in natural objects, even though it is induced by social needs. (Ontology 3, p. 39-40)
The relationship that labour creates between man and nature is, as we have seen, the only real teleological positing for Lukács. As a consequence of this role, labour has a special place as an activity that, by instantiating the locus where causality and consciousness intersect, gives origin to a new type of being with its proper relations and characteristics, i.e. the social being. Thus, labour involves a process between human activity and nature, where actions are directed towards transforming natural objects into use-values. In itself, labour is the original and most basic social interaction that gives origin to all the rest. In more developed forms of social practice, Lukács says, the focus shifts to the impact on other people, ultimately aiming at the production of use-values. Here, the teleological intentions attempt to induce other people to undertake specific teleological actions themselves. In derived social interactions teleological positing shifts its focus into changing and giving origin to other types of teleological positing with the ultimate aim of changing nature (Ibid). This issue arises once labour becomes sufficiently social to require cooperation among several individuals, regardless of whether the problem of exchange-value has emerged or if the cooperation is simply directed towards use-value production. Thus, this second form of teleological intention, where the goal is to set goals for others, can appear. Although the operating features of this complex process are not thoroughly specified by Lukács, still he offers a panoramic of its implications. Lukács implies that part of this complex interaction has been feasible and enhanced by the use of language. About this, Lukács believes that a genetic derivation of speech or conceptual thought from labour is possible, as the labour process imposes demands on the subject that can only be met by transforming pre-existing abilities into language and conceptual thought (Ibid, p. 49). The ability of speech, undoubtedly important in the practice of labour, is additionally in close relationship with the social character of the man. From this, Lukács says that humanity’s ontological conceptions are influenced by social factors of different sorts (Ibid). These ideas play a crucial role in social practice and can often solidify into a social power, leading to a conflict between ontological conceptions with an objective scientific basis and those rooted solely in the social being.
Bibliographical References
Avineri, S. (1971). Labor, alienation, and social classes in Hegel’s Realphilosophie. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1 (1), 96-119. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265093
Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). Elements of the Philosophy of Right (H. B. Nisbet, Trans.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Infranca, A., & Vedda, M. (2019). Ontology and labor in Lukács’ late thought. In M. J. Thompson (Ed.), Georg Lukács and the possibility of critical social ontology (pp. 1-20). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004415522_003
Lukács, G. (1978). Ontology of Social Being, Vol. 1: Hegel’s False and his Genuine Ontology (D. Fernbach, Trans.). London: Merlin. (Original work published 1971).
Lukács, G. (1978). Ontology of Social Being, Vol. 2: Marx’s Basic Ontological Principles (D. Fernbach, Trans.). London: Merlin. (Original work published 1971).
Lukács, G. (1980). Ontology of Social Being, Vol. 3: Labour (D. Fernbach, Trans.). London: Merlin. (Original work published 1971).
Thompson, M. J. (2019). Introduction. In M. J. Thompson (Ed.), Georg Lukács and the possibility of critical social ontology (pp. 1-15). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004415522_002
Visual References
Cover Image and Figures 1- 5: Van Limburg, H., Van Limburg, J., Van Limburg, P. (1416) Calendar - Labors of the Months. Images retrieved from a single painting from https://www.wikiart.org/en/limbourg-brothers/labors-of-the-months
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