Labour as the Basis for Social Normativity
The presentation of Marxist philosophy, usually focused on its political aspects, overlooks, at times, the normative aspects of the system. This means that a Marxist philosophical framework can be assessed by looking at the discussion of the passage from a purely descriptive view of nature, social reality, and human action, to a normative one. In other words, such a framework can be presented in the context of the transition from an is, describing the current state of affairs of society, to an ought, presenting what must be done in order to reach a specific purpose. Thus, an assessment of social reality from a Marxist perspective would not just include a presentation of its current state but also a set of conditions from which the correct actions could be performed.
In this article, the general Marxist framework will be assessed in light of the possibility of building a normative framework from the central concept of labour, as it is the conceptual cornerstone for understanding society. Although the space dedicated to this article will not (and possibly cannot) permit a thorough assessment of all Marxist thinkers, it will give an idea of the core aspects of Marxist thoughts on the topic. For this, the thoughts of Gyorgy Lukacs will be presented, as his thought represents, due to its direct inheritance from Marx’s thought, a faithful representation of Marxism and its ideas on the activity of labour. With this objective in mind, three objectives are to be met. The first one is to establish a general view of what is understood by “social normativity” and some of the basic features of what constitutes a normative claim. The second is to present Lukács’ general view of value in the context of the transition from descriptive to normative claims. The third objective is to assess the role of labour in establishing social normativity and affecting the aforementioned transition. To achieve these objectives the relationship between three central concepts will be presented. First, the relationship between labour and value. Second, the relationship between value and ought. And third, the relationship between labour and ought.
Marxist thought gives a central role to the activity of labour in the formation and development of society and the relationships that arise in it. It is, according to Marx (1867), and Lukács (1972), an activity that breaches the gap between individuals and the social structure erected by their association. The reason for this is that labour is the activity, carried out by humans, that allows for the materialisation of goals and purposes in nature. Through the activity of labour, humans are able to materialise their intentions and goals, which leads to an association between individuals who share a common objective. As a consequence, labour is the primary source of value of commodities in a capitalist society. By assessing labour in the context of social normativity we intend to pay attention to its role in the formation of norms, rules, and standards that govern behavior within a society. From this, we could expect that it is similarly central in guiding and regulating individuals' actions and interactions within society. These norms could potentially include both explicit rules, like laws and regulations, and implicit expectations, like cultural customs.
Following David Copp and Justin Morton (2022) we can contextualise the question about normativity as the one that tries to understand, in general terms, what property we are referring to when we talk about something that oughts to be done, in the context of the social. When talking about normative claims, one talks of claims that do not just describe some state of affairs, but that provide reasons for actions or attitudes (Copp and Morton, 2022). Normative claims tell us something about reasons for acting or thinking a certain way through language that refers to the “rights” and “wrongs” of actions. It is not the same, for example, to say “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the means to achieve socialism” as saying that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the right means to achieve socialism”. The latter sentence, presenting not just a mere description, has a special normative, action-guiding, weight to it. As a consequence, any assessment of normativity must be able to explain the transition from a descriptive claim to a normative one.
The importance of normativity seems evident for Marxist author Gyorgy Lukács in how he understands its relationship with labour’s capacity to materialise a posited objective (also referred to as teleological positing). About this, he says:
lf we proceed now from the fact that the decisive act of the subject is his teleological positing and the realization of this, it is immediately illuminating that the categorically decisive moment in these acts involves the emergence of a practice determined by the ought. The immediately determining moment of any action intended as a realization must straightaway be the ought, since each step in the realization is determined by whether and how it promotes the attainment of the goal. (Ontology 1, p. 65-66)
From this passage, we can see that Lukács acknowledges the emergence of the ought as a necessary consequence of the teleological positing carried out by the individual and its realisation. The ought appears here as a determination of the positing of a goal as it carries out with it the conditions for the proper obtention of the desired end. Regarding this, the interpretation of Murillo van der Laan (2019) highlights that, at the same time, the concept of the ought and value are intimately related categories. They are also linked to what Lukács and, indirectly, Marx, view as the first expression of freedom in the social being. The potentialities inherent in reality, Van der Laan assesses, compel the worker to choose between specific alternatives and realise the chosen alternative inevitably requires a specific behaviour from the individual who brings into existence what was previously envisioned. Thus, he goes, freedom is tied to ought because achieving a goal necessitates that every step taken by the subject must be evaluated to determine how it can fulfil a particular need (Van der Laan, 2019, p. 86). Thus, ought emerges inherently in the practice Marx and Lukács consider the fundamental phenomenon in social existence, labour. It refers to a future direction established by the previously idealised goal in the labour process and is necessarily determined by the worker's objective, shaping her behaviour as she strives to achieve her goal. However, ought must be understood in relation to the specific context in which it appears.
The connection of the ought with value relates to the social practice of determining future behaviour in function to the assignation of value toward what is aimed to be materialised (Ibid). Furthermore, the realisation of value can only be attained when it activates ought as the guide for the individual's practice. In Van der Laan’s reading, value influences the goal and the evaluation of the objectified result, while ought relates to the regulative process of objectification (Ibid, p. 88). This is evinced directly in Lukács’s writings when he says that:
The two categories [ought and value] certainly belong so intimately together because they are both moments of a common complex. But because value influences above all the positing of the goal and is the principle of judgement on the realized product, while the ought rather provides the regulator of the process itself, much must distinguish the two as categories of social being: this does not remove their correlation, but on the contrary makes it more concrete. (Ontology 3, p. 75)
For Lukács, values are not simply subjective judgments since they are grounded in the objective utility of use-values, i.e. the ability of a good or service to satisfy a human need or desire. The correctness of these judgments is determined by the objective properties of use values and the interpretation of values requires an adequate analysis of labour and its role in the emergence of social being. The social objectivity of use values arises from the interaction between teleology and causality in labour, addressing the essential task of the metabolism between humans and nature. Values, centred on goal-setting and the evaluation of objectified results, demand a certain behaviour from the individual, the ought, to successfully realise goals (Ibid). Thus, understanding value from the perspective of the economy is useful, Van der Laan says, since it draws an articulation between objectivity and subjectivity in economic valuations (Ibid). Through a philosophical extension of Marx's perspective on labour and practice, Lukács offers an interpretation of values that goes beyond Marx’s original stance. He emphasises two key aspects, already mentioned in Chapter 1 above: the causality that individuals must navigate to achieve successful objectifications, and the evaluation of the available alternatives along with the internalisation of these demands, as expressed by the category of ought. Through a philosophical development of Marx’s perspective on labour and practice, Lukács provides a reading of values that complements Marx’s position by emphasizing, on one hand, the causality individuals must confront to achieve successful objectification, and on the other, the evaluation of the alternatives available to them and the processes through which they internalize these demands (Ibid). The multiple valuations that determine the decisions of purchase and sale, in the simple exchange of commodities, can result in a crisis that acts objectively against buyers and sellers, rendering economic value “counterproductive”. Compared to use values, this is a much more complex moment. The objectivity here is stressed in the synthesis of these diverse acts, which underlies the valuation and the decisions made. This is to say, it is from this synthesis that economic valuations emerge and it must be reported to verify the potential success of a particular act (Ibid). This constitutes the objective relation that underlies the valuations in the economic complex, but must be comprehended as the attempt of Lukács to grasp the processual development of the social being: economy of time, however, immediately involves a relation of value. Even simple labour, oriented just to use value, was a subjugation of nature by and for man, both in its transformation to suit his needs and in his attaining control over his own merely natural instincts and emotions, and is thus a mediating factor in the initial elaboration of his specifically human abilities (Ibid).
Now we are in a better position to give an account of labour and normativity. Labour plays a crucial role in the development of social normativity because it acts as the foundational activity through which individuals engage with and transform their environment, thereby shaping social relations and norms. Through the labour process, individuals confront the material world and must make decisions about how to best achieve their goals, which implies choosing between concrete alternatives and internalising the demands posed by these choices. It is in this process that the ought, as action-guiding, emerges. The notion of ought represents the normative dimension that originates in labour, guiding behaviour and decision-making. When individuals engage in labour, they engage in a process that forms their social and ethical relations. The goals and objectives set during labour require practical realisation, linking normative aspirations with concrete actions. Labour also fosters social cooperation and interdependence, as individuals work together to achieve common goals. This cooperation necessitates the establishment of norms and values that facilitate collective action and social cohesion. The shared experiences and challenges encountered in labour contribute to the formation of a common understanding of what is valuable and what ought to be done, further reinforcing social norms. Moreover, the objectification of labour, where idealised goals are transformed into material reality, influences not only external behaviour but also self-perception and identity. The successful realization of labour objectives validates certain behaviours and practices, embedding them within the social fabric as normative standards. From this, we see that the influence of teleological positing, as the primary example of human praxis can bring about a normative dimension.
The category of ought is connected to value, as what individuals aim to objectify in their labour must be perceived as valuable to guide their actions. Value, in this context, is not an inherent property of objects but arises from the social relations and teleological processes involved in labour. It is through the interplay of teleology and natural causality that values and norms are articulated and internalized. Labour is the original phenomenon through which social beings encounter and shape the world, giving rise to the normative structures that govern social life. It is through this process that individuals internalize societal values, norms, and expectations, thereby contributing to the ongoing process of social normativity. This dynamic process ensures that labour remains central to the development and transformation of social norms, as it continuously generates new challenges and opportunities for normative reflection and action.
An important point to highlight in this last part of this section is the divergence of Lukács’ idea of the origin of social normativity with what can be counted as a “conventional” explanation of it and the difficulties it brings about as a consequence of its nature. This point is highlighted by Stahl (2019) and Smetona (2019) in their presentation of the particularities of Lukács’ views on normativity. While, as we have seen, Lukács conceives labour as the foundation for normatively-determined practices, conventional ideas about normativity present the ought as independent of the specific alternatives presented to individuals as a consequence of teleological positing (Smetona, 2019). Social practices are seen as “embodiments of absolute commandments” that transcend humanity itself and do not derive from its practices (Ibid, p. 75). Lukács’ view, as it diverges from this traditional position, presents a problem when we have to start dealing with the level of objectivity that is traditionally expected by normative accounts. Lukács’ thoughts on normativity do not isolate the phenomenon from individual instances of human praxis, taking away force from the idea of the possibility of generalised objective-like social practices that give a normative framework. Critical theories, like Lukács’, present an idea of normativity that locates the origin of normativity in society in the attribution of functions to the tools available for the realisation of a posited goal (Stahl, 2019, p. 373). This makes sense in a context where both normative-intentional positing through the individual anticipation of the result of an action and the determination of possible routes to achieving that goal by natural laws play a relevant role, as it occurs in the context of labour. This is made clearer when Lukács says that:
[...] When we consider not the individual isolated act of teleological positing, but rather the totality of these acts and their mutual relations with one another in a given society, we inevitably come to establish tendential similarities, convergences, types, etc. The proportion of these convergent or divergent tendencies in this totality shows the reality of the concrete space for teleological positing that we have just indicated. The real social process, from which arises not only the positing of the goal but also the discovery and application of the means, defines precisely the concretely limited space for possible questions and answers, for alternatives that can actually be realized. The determining components appear still more concretely and firmly defined in the existing totality than in the individual acts of positing when these are considered in isolation. (Ontology 3, p. 38-39)
From passages such as this Lukács seems to assume, Stahl says, that only labour can provide a non-mysterious basis for normative criteria as emerging from broadly natural processes. If we accept this, we can understand how, through the imposition of functions, tools emerge as the first social entities whose internal teleological structure becomes part of intersubjective reality (Stahl, 2019). Cooperative labour processes require achieving a shared understanding of that structure and thereby form the basis of all other kinds of social normativity. Lukàcs’ explanation on this matter, as presented in the introduction, leads Stahl to highlight some questions to be answered. He presents mainly two strong objections out of which just the first will be addressed in the following sections.
It is unclear, Stahl says, why only tools can play this role, and why, for example, communication about goals does not also introduce language as an independent source of normative commitments. As we have presented above, Lukács does highlight the relevance of language in the process of development of labour. After all, the emergence of language represents a pivotal moment in which the individually-originated posited goals start being shared in view of common aims. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why no special structure of language, originated through this process and does not constitute an independent, or even parallel, source of normativity. Also unclear is whether Lukács adopts a relatively standard Humean idea about normative commitment as the result of a combination of desire and knowledge, which leads to the question about the role of individuals and the set of intentional states in the context of this normative commitment (Ibid). Additionally, it remains unclear why labour gives rise to a form of normativity that is, in some non-trivial sense, essentially social. After all, Lukács’ conception of labour refers to an activity that can be performed by individuals (Ibid). If the anticipatory imagination forms the normative standard for labour, it seems entirely possible to explain the resulting normativity independently of cooperative contexts and as something applicable to a solitary worker (Ibid, p. 374). Theoretically, by how Lukàcs’ theory is presented, this could be possible even if there is no possible instance of this occurring in reality. In other words, labour-based normativity does not seem to have social preconditions and does not necessarily lead to socially shared norms. By taking labour as the origin of sociality and by describing it as an activity in which individuals enter into a special relation with the environment, there is no reason to presuppose sociality in the labour process from the outset. This issue is stated by Stahl when he says:
What such a theory of labor-based normativity cannot explain, however, is the emergence of types of intentionality by which people create new institutional rules and, concomitantly, new needs emerge. If one assumes that all norms ultimately emerge from needs-directed interaction between people, then there is room to explain how the resulting practices become increasingly complex in their quest to satisfy the relevant needs, and perhaps even how derived needs that relate to the requirements of participation in such practices emerge. The resulting model will still be instrumentalist to a certain extent, however – as Lukács argues, language and institutions are mere means of the “generalization” of more particular forms of action. It will not be able to explain the emergence of new social action types that have goals which are completely divorced from need satisfaction. (Stahl, 2019, p. 384)
Lukács’ analysis appears to Stahl as being thoroughly individualistic, even though it has been presented in the context of the emergence of sociality. The possibility of individuality playing a relevant role in the emergence of teleological positing leaves the door open for this problem to arise. Society and labour are necessarily linked merely insofar as people create causal connections between each other’s activities through the unintended consequences of their actions, which then gradually form a systemic structure (Ibid). Lukács combines the individualist reduction of labour-based normativity with a quasi-system-theoretic analysis of the social integration of individual goals into one overarching structure of production by anonymous laws. Stahl’s second large objection presents the unclarity of why the structure of labour should be key to understanding society rather than merely being one element within a broader theory of social norms (Ibid). Even if the normative ought of social rules is always a result, directly or indirectly, of the interaction of human anticipation with natural-law necessity, it remains possible that social normative structures have their own logic, such that we learn very little about them by examining the structure of the labour process.
Despite these objections, Lukács’ discussion offers resources for addressing them. One of the main points made by Lukács concerning the underlying individualism in the description of labour is presenting the moral problem of Bolshevism as the issue of following the “proper” methods of revolutionary action, whose valuation is subject to the attainment of the desired goal.
Admittedly, Lukács often seems to endorse a relatively simplistic subjectivist-utilitarian analysis of how labour can be evaluated concerning its effects (Ibid). Nonetheless, considering his emphasis on the idea that the relevant needs for such an evaluation are of a “social character,” there is a broader understanding of the whole issue by giving two possible interpretations. One interpretation is that some needs are products of social practices, processes, and institutions. These needs either constitutively depend on social contexts or are causally related to social practices as possible consequences of socialisation. Nevertheless, this interpretation cannot be exhausted here since while these needs are social, they are not social needs in an ontological sense, i.e. they are needs of individuals and they are essential to self-realisation. A way of tackling this interpretation, Stahl proposes, is to recognise that in Lukács there is a differentiation between an “original intention” of the teleological positing, meant to satisfy some need, and understanding labour in an “objectively social context” in which case it acquires a general nature that “transcends” the subject (Stahl, 2019, p. 376). While initially, individuals work to satisfy their own needs, the norms governing their labour change in stages where the social environment impacts their actions, thus changing what they do in a social ontological sense, a process that took form with the division of labour. In this phase, the determination of purpose suffers a change due to sociality thus becoming more homogeneous. As a consequence, Stahl makes a reading of Lukács and his view on labour and individuality in which labour processes are ontologically and originally heterogeneous. On the one hand, they are guided by socially determined needs. On the other hand, the means to fulfil these needs are determined by natural properties and laws, not socially defined. Labour thus requires matching a standard that transcends the individual's representation of it with natural facts, thus combining elements from two ontological spheres. If successful, the individual's anticipation establishes a “homogeneous” standard governing their activities, homogenising heterogeneity through the labour process, particularly when socially defined needs form the standard for choosing means (Ibid, p. 377).
When Lukács discusses social needs that must be satisfied, the social aspect should refer to the source of the normative significance of individual needs, determining also the content of such needs. In other words, what counts as fulfilling a need should be viewed also as socially established. Although Lukács never explicitly endorses this claim we suppose that the social constitution of needs extends to their content and the way this content is reflected in labour-guiding intentions is necessary to make sense of further claims in the ontology. A similar reading is presented by Mezsaros (2019) who presents that Lukács’ ought is grounded in a “longing for objectivity” (Mezsaros, 2019, p. 41). Modern times, Lukács thought, have the need to deal with "bad objectivity" and emphasise the relationship between social structures and individual agency. He argues that social progress requires individuals to make conscious decisions between alternatives, influenced by economic factors but ultimately determined by human choices. Lukács' work, Mezsaros argues, although seeks for objective force to guide human action, it also acknowledges that the conflict between "what is" and "what ought to be" cannot be completely resolved (Ibid). What must be highlighted is that individuals, through understanding and making conscious choices, can realise their potential and change their lives, which involves a theoretical understanding that current social conditions are just forms of underlying real processes. Therefore, awakening independent, self-aware personalities, made possible by economic progress, is crucial. Thus, Mezsaros continues, the intentions guiding labour should not be understood as independent of their objective aim. This suggests that if products and means acquire a historical character through the process of homogenisation then the way intentions relate to their satisfactory conditions will be determined by categories instituted in social practice, regardless of the individual's representation of these conditions (Ibid).
Lukács’ Marxist framework offers a unique perspective on social normativity by grounding it in the concept of labour. Through labour, individuals engage with their environment, setting goals and making decisions that inherently involve normative judgments—what ought to be done. This process shapes not only social relations but also the norms and values that guide collective behaviour. Lukács argues that labour is the foundational activity from which social norms emerge, as it transforms individual actions into social practices that reflect shared goals. While this approach diverges from conventional views that see norms as independent of individual actions, it underscores the integral role of labour in shaping both individual and collective norms, thereby linking the practical activity of labour with the broader social structures that govern human interactions. However, critiques of Lukács’ theory highlight the challenges of reconciling individual agency with the broader social context, questioning whether labour alone can account for the full complexity of social norms. Despite these critiques, Lukács’ emphasis on labour as the cornerstone of social normativity remains a significant contribution to understanding the intersection of individual agency, social structures, and normative frameworks.
Bibliographical References
Copp, D., & Morton, J. (2022). Normativity in metaethics. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/normativity-metaethics/
Lukács, G. (1971a). Ontology of Social Being, Vol. 1: Hegel’s False and his Genuine Ontology (D. Fernbach, Trans.). London: Merlin. (Original work published 1978, see part III in GW 13).
Lukács, G. (1971b). Ontology of Social Being, Vol. 3: Labour (D. Fernbach, Trans.). London: Merlin. (Original work published 1980, see part I in GW 14).
Marx, K. (1992). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (E. Mandel, Ed.). New York: Penguin. (Original work published 1867).
Mészáros, I., (1972) Lukács’ Concept of Dialectic, London: Merlin Press.
Smetona, M. J. (2019). Chapter 3: Lukács’ ontology of social being and the material basis of intentionality. In Georg Lukács and the Possibility of Critical Social Ontology (pp. 59–84). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004415522_005
Stahl, T. (2019). Chapter 12: Normativity and totality: Lukács’ contribution to a critical social ontology. In Georg Lukács and the Possibility of Critical Social Ontology (pp. 251–269). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004415522_014
Van der Laan, M. (2019). Chapter 4: György Lukács’ ontological interpretation of Marx’s labor theory of value. In Georg Lukács and the Possibility of Critical Social Ontology (pp. 85–104). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004415522_006
Visual References
Cover Image: Matta, R. (1951) Les Roses sont belles. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/les-roses-sont-belles-1951
Image 1: Matta, R. (1936) Panama. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/panama-1936
Image 2: Matta, R. (Unknown) Atlas de Medication. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/atlas-de-medication
Image 3: Matta, R. (1937) Morphology. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/morphology-1937
Image 4: Matta, R. (Unknown) Pyrocentre. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/pyrocentre
Image 5: Matta, R. (1947) Chamboles les amoureuses. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/chamboles-les-amoureuses-1947
Image 6: Matta, R. (1938) Glande Fiction. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/glande-fiction-1938
Image 7: Matta, R. (1956) Le Pianiste. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/le-pianiste-1956
Image 8: Matta, R. (1937) Snail's Trace. Image retrieved from https://www.wikiart.org/en/roberto-matta/snail-s-trace-1937
I was expecting you to say. Now suppose your streaking friend begins to cannibalize the umpire, uno online. This would be a taboo.