Reforming the UK’s Electoral System: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective
Introduction
The foundation of democracy lies in the right to choose, which is instrumentalized through elections. Although this concept may appear simple and straightforward, how votes are cast, counted, and ultimately translated into an elected government is highly significant and consequential for the democratic process (Catterall, 2000). For this reason, every democratic regime establishes a set of rules to determine the nature of its electoral system. This system, in turn, influences voter behavior, political party strategies, the nature of political competition, and even the stability of the entire political system. Consequently, whether a state adopts a proportional representation system, a majoritarian system, or a hybrid of the two is integral to shaping its democratic outcomes.
One of the most basic and historically significant examples of electoral arrangements is the majoritarian system based on the first-past-the-post (FPTP) approach, which has long played a central role in shaping political and democratic processes in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. This system provides a straightforward method for determining representatives by awarding victory to the candidate with the most votes in a constituency. Its simplicity and intuitive design make it a favorable choice (Blais, 2008). However, it comes with several significant caveats that fundamentally impact the exercise of the right to choose. Critics often argue that FPTP undermines the scope of representation by favoring major parties while severely limiting the influence of smaller political actors, including minorities, women, and single-issue parties such as feminist parties (Virgint, 2016). Despite these criticisms, FPTP has remained dominant in the UK for over two centuries, enduring persistent calls for reform and even a 2011 referendum on introducing the Alternative Vote system (Gibson-Morgan, 2013). This article will therefore examine the nature of FPTP in the UK and its resilience to change through the lens of the historical institutionalist approach.
What is historical institutionalism?
To understand the impact of historical processes on the persistence and functioning of the FPTP electoral system in the UK, it is first essential to establish conceptual and theoretical tools. Given that the electoral system is a prime example of an institutional framework, the historical institutionalist approach emerges as the most appropriate for this analysis. Historical institutionalism is a branch of the new institutionalist approach, as it considers institutions to encompass both formal and informal structures (Lowndes, 2018). However, it diverges from both traditional institutionalism and other forms of new institutionalism by emphasizing the causal impact of historical processes in explaining many of the outcomes observed in current institutional dynamics (Lowndes, 2018). More specifically, historical institutionalism seeks to examine institutional development and the power dynamics among different social groups, while rejecting functionalist explanations of institutions. To analyze historical processes and power dynamics, this approach employs two central concepts: critical junctures and path dependency (Lowndes, 2018).
Path dependency and critical junctures are closely interconnected and inseparable concepts. Simply put, a critical juncture represents a disruption in path dependency (Hall & Taylor, 1996). More specifically, history can be understood as a continuum interrupted by critical junctures, defined as “moments when substantial institutional change takes place, thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical development moves onto a new path” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). In other words, institutions emerge from critical junctures, persist within historical continuity, and eventually transform subsequent critical junctures. The catalyst for critical junctures is often exogenous shocks—crises affecting the broader structure rather than the institution itself (Hogan, 2019). Thus, both the formation and transformation of institutional arrangements, as well as disruptions to institutional equilibrium, can be attributed to critical junctures triggered by exogenous shocks (Hogan, 2019).
Path dependence, in contrast, explains the trajectory of institutions following critical junctures. At each critical juncture, there is a metaphorical fork in the road with alternative paths. Once an institution embarks on one of these paths, altering the course of its development becomes increasingly difficult (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Thus, “the juncture is critical as they place institutional arrangements on trajectories difficult to alter” (Hogan, 2019, p. 172).
The concept of path dependence is underpinned by the theory of increasing returns. This theory posits that the benefits of maintaining the existing institutional arrangement increase over time, while the cost of switching to an alternative path increases correspondingly (Pierson, 2000). Even when institutions begin to perform sub-optimally, “the farther into the process we are, the harder it becomes to shift from one path to another” (Pierson, 2000, p. 253). For example, the deeply ingrained knowledge of an institution and the behavioral adaptations of major political parties often render change prohibitively costly in terms of financial resources and education (Blau, 2008).
Finally, both core concepts of historical institutionalism are rooted in the premise of power asymmetry. Institutions inherently allocate power to specific social and political groups, which in turn have little incentive to alter those institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996). As Pierson (1996) explains, “When certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the employment of power may be self-reinforcing” (p. 259). This dynamic can be problematic, as historical institutionalism acknowledges the collective nature of political institutions. Institutional arrangements inevitably impact all groups, including those disadvantaged by the prevailing power dynamics (Pierson, 2000). As a result, most social and political actors engage with institutions in some capacity, even when the institutional design and structure are unfavorable to them. This engagement further solidifies those institutional arrangements, making them difficult to reverse.
In summary, the understanding of the development and persistence of the FPTP system in the UK relies on the historical institutionalist approach. The concepts of path dependency and critical junctures, as well as the inherent power asymmetry, as the approach’s main conceptual tools, are utilized correspondingly.
Emergence of the FPTP in the UK
Although the origins of the FPTP system in the UK can be traced back to late medieval times, the creation of the unified United Kingdom Parliament at the beginning of the 19th century marked a significant moment in solidifying its role. This unification involved merging the old Parliament of Great Britain with the Parliament of Ireland to form a single legislative body, reinforcing the centrality of FPTP in electing the first unified House of Commons (Klemperer, 2019). This unification and the resulting transformation represent an example of an exogenous critical juncture—an external event that provided an opportunity to establish or reform electoral institutions. The decision to fortify the FPTP at this juncture set the institution on a trajectory that has endured, leading to its continued use in British elections today.
Nevertheless, along this path, several critical junctures offered opportunities to diverge from and reform the institution. The Act of Union of 1800, for example, was fraught with inequalities. The electorate was restricted to around 40,000 voters based on land ownership, creating a significant imbalance of representation, with English MPs heavily favored over their Scottish and Irish counterparts (Klemperer, 2019). This highlights the pivotal role of power imbalances in shaping institutional frameworks. Electoral arrangements during this period were deeply intertwined with the prevailing power dynamics, reflecting the interests of the land-owning class and, in particular, the English nobility. These ingrained power structures influenced the unification process and reinforced the institutional status quo.
The emergence and evolution of the FPTP system in the UK during the 19th century align closely with the principles of historical institutionalism. Reforms to the system were hard-fought, gradual, and largely superficial, preserving its core structure and underscoring the significance of institutional path dependence. Furthermore, these changes were driven by exogenous critical junctures, such as the rise of the labor movement and the suffragist movement. The power imbalance favoring the English nobility is evident both in the original FPTP system implemented after unification and in subsequent reforms. By the post-World War II era, the system had become deeply ingrained, reflecting a persistent path dependency that has rendered radical reforms virtually impossible.
Reforming the FPTP in the UK
In the aftermath of WWII, most continental European democracies were based on some form of proportional representation, with the UK remaining one of the few outliers that continued to use the FPTP system (Klemperer, 2019). With universal suffrage secured, the question of electoral reform was initially absent from public discussion. However, by the mid-1970s, discontent with the FPTP system became increasingly prominent (Blau, 2008). The two-party system, which had been reinforced by the logic of the single-member FPTP system, led to some peculiar and democratically contradictory outcomes. For instance, it was common for a party to receive fewer votes yet secure more seats, or for smaller parties to win a disproportionate number of seats relative to their vote share (Blau, 2008).
Despite these undemocratic developments, the push for electoral reform was ultimately unsuccessful. From the perspective of historical institutionalism, this seemingly irrational persistence of the FPTP system can be explained. First, power asymmetry is central to understanding this persistence. The dominance of the two-party system, with alternating control between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, was perhaps at its peak in the post-war period (Klemperer, 2019). Even when the electoral system was sub-optimal for one of these parties—for example, when the Labour Party emerged victorious in 1974 despite coming second in votes (Blau, 2008)—the major parties recognized that a reversal of the situation was equally likely. In other words, both parties were beneficiaries of the system, which consistently outweighed occasional setbacks, such as in 1974. As a result, there was little incentive for change among the dominant parties. Minority parties, on the other hand, did push for reform, particularly when they gained momentum, such as during the 1980s (Blau, 2008). However, power asymmetry meant that those in power—the major parties—were the ones benefiting from the existing system. Conversely, minority parties, despite their calls for reform, lacked the political power to effect change.
Moreover, as previously stated, “the farther into the process we are, the harder it becomes to shift from one path to another” (Pierson, 2000, p. 253), and this is evident in the UK’s electoral system. By the 1980s, the system had been in place for 180 years with only minor changes. Thus, even when sub-optimal, it was so entrenched that any significant change became unlikely. The only potential driver for reform could have been an exogenous critical juncture of substantial proportion, such as WWI or WWII. In both periods, reform efforts were made but ultimately failed due to other exogenous factors (Klemperer, 2019). This illustrates that critical junctures during the earlier phases of institutional development tend to be more impactful and radical, whereas later junctures when the institution is more established, have less effect (Pierson, 2000). Therefore, when pressure for reform emerged in the 1980s, it was endogenous—arising from the institutional arrangement itself—and as such, it was doomed to fail.
The undemocratic nature of the system and the critique against it persisted with mixed results well into the 21st century (Blau, 2008). The most significant opportunity for reform came in the aftermath of the 2010 General Election. Despite the de facto two-party system in the post-war era, the 2010 electoral results led to a coalition government—an extremely unusual development in the UK (Gibson-Morgan, 2013). The coalition included the Conservatives, who were generally opposed to any reform of the FPTP system, and the Lib Dems, who advocated for a complete transformation and the adoption of proportional representation (Gibson-Morgan, 2013). A compromise was reached to consider an Alternative Vote (AV) system, which retains the FPTP logic while incorporating some characteristics of a proportional system to increase legitimacy (Gibson-Morgan, 2013). Eventually, a referendum on adopting the AV system was held in 2011, but it failed to gain the support of the electorate (Laycock et al., 2013). The conclusions drawn from the failure of the referendum suggest that, once again, path dependence is crucial in understanding the persistence of sub-optimal institutions, reaching even outside the institution itself—that is, to the voters. Secondly, the major parties officially opposed the reform in the referendum (Gibson-Morgan, 2013), further reinforcing the power imbalance.
Conclusion
Institutions are the foundational framework of any functioning society; however, their importance is often understated. Using historical institutionalism and the case of the FPTP electoral system in the UK, this article demonstrates that the historical path and development of an institution are key determinants of how it operates and persists over time. While calls for reform and change to the sub-optimal arrangement of the UK electoral system have been present for decades, the status quo has remained in place. Therefore, to understand political systems and their impact on everyday life, it is crucial to examine the historical development of institutional frameworks.
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