The etymological root of 'Crassus errare' and its connection to the Battle of Carrhae
Words are like living beings, capable of enduring and adapting to any context reminding us of historical moments that persist, unaffected by the passage of time. Words are a human invention, and as such, they are eternally linked to our world and everything that happens within it. A clear example of this is the expression Crassus errare, which comes from Latin and has been used since the times of the Roman Republic to refer to a grave and unforgivable mistake.
Although nowadays the word crass means ‘thick’, ‘fat’ or ‘gross’ (Onions, 1996, p. 225) its origins are linked to one of the greatest Roman figures in history. In the 1st century BC, the politician and military leader Marcus Licinius Crassus became one of the most powerful men in Ancient Rome by establishing the First Triumvirate together with Gaius Julius Caesar and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus. In 55 BC, seeking to match the military achievements of his companions, Crassus embarked on one of the greatest military campaigns of the time by deciding to invade Parthia (Northwestern Iran) with an army of 42,000 soldiers.
Who was Marcus Licinius Crassus?
Marcus Licinius Crassus (115-53 BC) was a historical figure of great relevance as well as one of the wealthiest men in Roman history. His life was marked by great triumphs and severe disappointments in both political and military fields. His enormous wealth gave him great political influence and two consulships (a magistracy in ancient Rome established in 509 BC as a replacement for the monarchy). Two consuls were elected annually to oversee the state, guaranteeing the fulfilment of the law, and serving as supreme commanders of the legions. Crassus reached the highest governmental positions and even financed the political career of Gaius Julius Caesar. However, his long pursuit of a great military victory that would equal or even overshadow his protégé and his eternal rival Pompeius ultimately cost him his life (Hereter, 2021).
Crassus was the son of Publius Licinius Crassus, consul in 97 BC, commander in Hispania, and a notable military leader who achieved great victories in Lusitania in 93 BC. Despite his great triumphs, he ended up committing suicide in 87 BC after being on the losing side of the Optimates against the Populares. The Optimates, a political faction focused on preserving the Senate's power and aristocratic privileges, were opposed by the Populares, who advocated for reforms such as land redistribution and debt relief to support the common people. Among the leaders of the Populares were Gaius Marius — uncle of Julius Caesar and seven-time consul — and Lucius Cornelius Cinna — a four-time consul and military leader —. Both strong opponents of Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix, the leader of the Optimates
After his father’s death and the fall of his family, the gens Licinia, the young Crassus fled to Hispania. He later returned, after Cinna’s death, to help Sulla overthrow Marius, achieving, together with the Optimate leader, absolute control over Italy. After their victory, Crassus took advantage of the situation to increase his personal fortune by confiscating the property of the declared enemies of the state. According to Plutarch — the Greek historian and philosopher —, Crassus had countless flaws, although his greed overshadowed all others. It is no coincidence that the 300 talents with which he began his political career increased to the enormous sum of 7,100 talents, according to the last inventory of his patrimony on the eve of his campaign to Parthia (Plutarch, 2013).
Although in his private life Crassus was discreet and was married to Tertulla, with whom he had two sons — one of whom fought alongside him in Parthia, sharing his tragic fate — he was not spared from slander, as he was intimately related to a vestal named Licinia. In Rome, such an act was considered not just a crime but a sacrilege punishable by death. Because of it, he was subjected to a trial. During the case, the truth came out, and he was acquitted after it was proven that Crassus had visited her to buy one of her properties on the outskirts of Rome and not to court her, as he had been accused. As Plutarch said, his reputation for respectability was saved due to his reputation for greed. Despite this, he was also known to be a generous man with his friends and popular among the people, providing them with feasts and free grain, as well as being polite and avoiding snobbery. This was probably due to his humble origins. He was also a great orator, a skill he perfected through his love of philosophy. Plutarch mentioned in his writings that even Cicero was reluctant to engage in a legal discussion with Crassus (Plutarch, 2013).
The Battle Against Spartacus and the First Triumvirate
In the early 70s BC, Spartacus — a Thracian gladiator and the leader of a major slave revolt against the Roman Republic — led an uprising that caused the Third Servile War, better known as the Slave Revolt, gathering an army of between 70,000 and 120,000 men (Serguidou, 2004, pp. 387-390). This army defeated two consuls with their respective Roman armies, provoking a severe internal political crisis. Considering this, the Senate suggested the name of Crassus to put an end to the rebellion and bring stability to the region. Although it is true that his name was proposed because the best commanders were busy in military campaigns abroad — Pompeius was in Hispania fighting against Sertorius, the right-hand man of Gaius Marius and leader of the popular cause in Hispania — the opportunity to defeat Spartacus gave Crassus the chance to demonstrate his military strength to the people of Rome, allowing him to compete against the military triumphs and fame of Pompeius, his eternal political enemy (Plutarch, 2016).
Crassus faced the mission with determination, remaining inflexible, tough, and ruthless. However, in 71 BC, he unsuccessfully attempted to corner the leader of the slaves, Spartacus, in Brucio. The battle was a failure due to his lieutenant Mummius, who ignored his leader's orders and attacked Spartacus prematurely. This action left the two legions under his command unprotected against the army of slaves, resulting in their defeat, the abandonment of arms, and the fleeing of the soldiers along with their commander. As retaliation for this act of cowardice, Crassus used an ancient punishment called decimatio: every tenth legionary was killed by their comrades in front of the entire army, making the legions understand what their fate would be if such an act of treason was committed ever again (Casio, 2011, p. 165).
In April 71 BC, commanding eight entire legions, four of which were made up of survivors defeated by the slaves, Crassus managed to isolate Spartacus in southern Italy, in Lucania, forcing him to engage in battle at the Sele River. The Roman leader achieved a complete victory and crucified 6,000 captive slaves along the Appian Way. It is worth mentioning that Spartacus' body was never found, fueling legends about how he possibly managed to escape death. Despite the overwhelming victory, Crassus received bitter news. At least 5,000 slaves had escaped after the defeat in Lucania, ultimately falling into the hands of Pompeius' army, which was returning from defeating Sertorius in Hispania. Pompeius defeated the captured, thus claiming the final victory, allowing himself to celebrate an undeserved triumph in the eyes of Crassus (Muñiz, 1998, p. 163). He only received an ovation — a lesser triumph compared to Pompeius' —, celebrating his victory without all the honours he deserved: no chariot, no scepter, no procession of soldiers, with a myrtle crown instead of a laurel, and the sacrifice of a sheep instead of a bull (Plutarch, 2004, p.151).
This episode increased Crassus' hatred, frustration, and resentment toward Pompeius, feelings that were strengthened by Pompeius' subsequent military victories — against the pirates in the Mediterranean and against King Mithridates of Pontus in the East.
It was Gaius Julius Caesar who played a key role in the reconciliation between the two, later securing their support to become consul. In exchange, Caesar procured them an agrarian reform that benefited Pompeius' veterans who fought alongside him in the East, as well as a law that cancelled a third of the debts owed by public contractors in Asia, further enriching Crassus and making his fortune legendary. This alliance made possible the creation of the First Triumvirate, a shadow government formed by Gaius Julius Caesar, Marcus Licinius Crassus, and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Suetonius, 1931, p.12).
Psychological Intimidation at the Battle of Carrhae
Parthia was a region known for its enormous territorial wealth and for controlling the area of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, better known as Mesopotamia. This control allowed the region to dominate the Silk Road, consolidating itself as a center of international trade of great value. As a result, the Parthian population became extremely wealthy, a prosperity coveted by the consul Marcus Licinius Crassus. With no obstacles or sanctions from the Senate as he had the support of his fellow triumvirs, Crassus decided to start his long-desired military campaign to the East. His goal was to obtain the riches of that territory and the military glory he envied, particularly the fame Caesar had earned due his unprecedented military successes in Britain and Gaul, and Pompeius had gained by defeating Mithridates the Great of Pontus and Sertorius in Hispania, as weel as taking credit for the victory over Spartacus. Unfortunately, Crassus was unaware of the climatic conditions in the area and the superiority of his opponent, the brilliant Parthian commander Surena (84 BC – 53 BC). The latter initiated a psychological battle against the Romans generating doubts among the superstitious legions after Crassus ignored Parthia's peace proposal and chose to attack them in a ruthless and unjustifiable manner (Scott, 2022).
Just before the campaign, Crassus made serious strategic mistakes that affected the morale of his army. He ignored the extreme disapproval of the tribunes about starting a war against the Parthians while having a treaty in place. Additionally, he chose to travel in winter, a time of terrible storms in the Mediterranean. This decision resulted in the loss of multiple vessels carrying both troops and supplies. But it was his decision to ignore an ally of Rome and King of Armenia, Artavasdes II (55-34 BC) that led to an unprecedented defeat. The king, aware of the Parthian mindset and the region's terrain, tried to dissuade Crassus from following the Euphrates River eastward, the route where supplies were transported. Artavasdes II suggested that the Roman legions march through Armenia and attack from the mountains, as Armenians would help them with troops and supply them on their journey, while also confusing the enemy by confronting them in a more suitable terrain for Roman infantry. Crassus decided to ignore and rely on the suggestions of Ariamnes, an Arab leader who knew the Parthians and had switched loyalties, betraying Rome. Gaining the consul's trust, he claimed to know the location of the enemy. He also swore that the Parthian army was composed of a limited number of troops fleeing to Scythia. Thus, while keeping Surena informed, Ariamnes led the Romans into the desert near Carrhae (modern Turkey) and then disappeared, setting a trap for them. Cassius, Crassus’ senior lieutenant, upon learning that the Parthian troops were waiting for them nearby, suggested resting and refreshing at a spring. However, Crassus decided to attack immediately, forcing his thirsty and exhausted troops to fight (Scott, 2022).
Battle of Carrhae
Marcus Licinius Crassus was sixty years old when he faced his fate at Carrhae. It was on June 9, 53 BC, when the Parthian and Roman troops finally met. Crassus had 42,000 soldiers, while the Parthians were only 10,000 men. The Roman leader ordered the formation of a huge square formed by twelve cohorts on each side, supported by their corresponding cavalry and infantry to prevent the army from being overtaken on the flanks. On the other hand, Surena, knowing that it was not possible to win a hand-to-hand battle against the Romans, decided to use 9,000 archers reinforced with 1,000 camels loaded with arrows. Moreover, the Parthian general hid much of his military force behind the vanguard to create the illusion that his army appeared small and filled the desert with the roaring sound of drums. Plutarch describes the sound as something similar to the cry of beasts mixed with the sound of thunder (Plutarch, 2013). Finally, just before the Roman advance, Surena had his army cover their armor with hides and tunics. As the Romans approached, the Parthians uncovered their armor, adding further uneasiness and anxiety to the already unsettled legionaries (Scott, 2022).
Throughout the battle, the Parthians focused on riding in front of the Roman legions, shooting arrows capable of piercing the armor and shields of their enemies while keeping a safe distance from the legions. At the same time, the archers coordinated the trajectories of their ammunition, so that while some shot directly at the Romans, others made high shots, allowing the projectiles to fall from above. As a result, a constant rain of arrows managed to effectively hinder the legionaries' defense. Initially, the legions managed to hold off the offensive, hoping that the archers would run out of ammunition, but General Surena had already thought of that inconvenience by keeping a contingent of a thousand camels with arrows alongside his army to maintain the offensive against the Romans. Thus, while the riders emptied their saddlebags, they were able to reload them at once and return to the fight. As a last resort, the Roman riders tried to approach the Parthian archers, but the Parthians would retreat and perform the famous "Parthian shot," which consisted of turning around in the saddle and continuing to assault the enemy as they retreated (De Souza, 2008, p.174).
Faced with this situation, Crassus decided as a last resort to send his son to the front along with three hundred cavalrymen, a thousand horsemen, eight cohorts, and five hundred archers to engage in direct combat with the enemy. At first, the maneuver seemed successful, as the Parthians began to retreat. However, it was another of Surena's strategies. He pretended to flee in order to separate and thus weaken the bulk of the Roman army. Surrounding them with his cavalry, he struck again with his archers. The battle continued, causing numerous casualties in the legions, until Crassus ordered a retreat, abandoning his wounded and dead on the battlefield. The next day, the Roman leader attempted to conduct negotiations with the Parthian general. As a result, Crassus and his generals were killed. In total, 30.000 soldiers were annihilated, and 10.000 were taken prisoner — hence the famous legend of the lost legion in China was born (Pisa Sanchez, 2022).
Conclusion
The flaws of the Roman general Crassus when planning the Battle of Carrhae have gone down in history as the ultimate example of Crassus errare. It is true that the exact moment in history when the term became associated with the historical figure of Crassus is unclear, but there is no doubt that it is closely tied to his mistakes. His irrevocable errors not only provoked one of the most devastating defeats in Roman history but also triggered a series of events that had terrible consequences for the Roman Empire. Crassus' decisions, overconfidence, poor judgment, and non-success to understand the tactical genius of Surena led to the annihilation of his army. Beyond the roman military catastrophe, this defeat drained the consul political efforts, led to the breakdown of the Triumvirate in Rome and provoked the beginning of a brutal civil war that would ultimately reshape the future of Rome. The Battle of Carrhae, therefore, not only marked the end of Crassus' life but also served as a turning point in Roman history, contributing to the fall of the Republic and the rise of imperial power.
Biographical References
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Pisa Sanchez, J. (2022, October 22). El Misterio de la Legión Perdida de Craso. Historia National Geographic. Site name:
https://historia.nationalgeographic.com.es/a/misterio-legion-perdida-craso-2_18525
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Scott Smith, P. (2022, November 10). Intimidación psicológica en la batalla de Carras [Psychological Intimidation at the Battle of Carrhae]. (J. A. Vergara, J. A. Trans). World History Encyclopedia. Site name: Intimidación psicológica en la batalla de Carras - Enciclopedia de la Historia del Mundo
Serguidou, A. (Ed.). (2004). Fear of Slaves. Fear of Enslavement in the Ancient Mediterranean. Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté
Suetonius., & Gavorse, J. (Ed.) (1931). The Lives of the Twelve Caesars. Modern Library
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