The European Union and the Western Balkans: Integration, Challenges, and Opportunities

The European Union (EU) is perhaps the most notable transnational achievement in history. It has managed to create an umbrella that encompasses a diverse array of small and large nations, each with its own distinct laws, constitutions, and currencies (Rezler, 2011). Not only has it been remarkable in uniting different member states, but it has also fostered an environment in which those states are willing to relinquish parts of their sovereignty to join the EU (Rezler, 2011). One reason for this attractiveness is that the EU, in its various phases, has managed to fulfill its main goal: the preservation of peace and prosperity (Emmert & Petrović, 2014). While the latter can certainly be questioned and debated, particularly regarding the relationship between the core and the periphery, as well as the overdependence of peripheral states (Belloni, 2009), it is a fact that EU member states have experienced an unprecedentedly long period of peace and cooperation. This reality alone makes the prospect of joining this previously elite club of nations highly desirable.

Nevertheless, even though the European Union has been nominally designed as an open-access organization since its founding, the enlargement process is much more complicated in practice, marked by inconsistencies and disappointments in certain cases (Emmert & Petrović, 2014). The ebbs and flows of the accession processes are nowhere more apparent than in what the EU has coined “the Western Balkans,” which includes the encircled parts of the former Yugoslavia and Albania that have not yet joined the EU (Dabrowski & Myachenkova, 2018). The entire transition process for the post-socialist countries of the Balkans has been framed by the prospect and ultimate goal of joining the EU, resulting in limited success -exemplified by the cases of Croatia and Slovenia- but also many grievances and disappointments along the way (Horvat & Štiks, 2015). In particular, several trends illustrate these challenges, from the Copenhagen criteria and the extension of conditions to join, which many perceive as moving the goalposts in the middle of the game (Rezler, 2011), to internal enlargement fatigue (Szolucha, 2010). Consequently, these inconsistencies have led to rising Euroscepticism among Western Balkan states (Belloni, 2016) and geopolitical reshuffling in the region (Panagiotou, 2021). This article will, then, critically examine the role of EU integration in the Western Balkans, its promises and failures, and potential lessons for the future.

Figure 1: European Union flag (2019) by Markus Spiske. Unsplash.

The role of the EU in the Western Balkans nation-building 

The Western Balkans refers to a group of states that emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia, with Albania included as an additional state. This term encompasses all the countries in the region that have not yet joined the EU but are at various stages of the accession process (Dabrowski & Myachenkova, 2018). Accession to the EU has been, at least nominally, one of the main strategic goals for these countries, and their development and commitments to liberal democracy have been shaped and influenced by the desire to meet the criteria established by EU bodies (Mitropolitski, 2013).

However, the EU has been one of the key actors since the early period of the existence of these new states. When Yugoslavia dissolved amid a series of wars, the EU, alongside the US, supported peacekeeping missions, humanitarian projects, and ultimately the formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Dayton Accords in 1995. Additionally, the EU has been the main supporter of Kosovo (Belloni, 2009). In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the role of the EU is particularly pronounced, with various mechanisms allowing the country to function effectively as “a semi-protectorate” (Belloni, 2009, p. 316). Therefore, when discussing the internal political commitments of these countries, it is important to highlight the limited playing field and the active role of the EU.

This means that the failure of accession can be attributed, at least in part, to the inconsistent policies of the EU. These policies have often been shaped by highly bureaucratic approaches and agendas that frequently do not lead to substantial outcomes (Belloni, 2016). For instance, in 1999, the EU created a Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), committing to the eventual integration of all Western Balkan countries (Belloni, 2009). First, the institutionalization of the enlargement plans conflated these countries, each with different levels of democracy and stability, into a single entity. Secondly, while the EU has declared the Western Balkans as inevitable future members, it has done so without consistent and earnest approaches. The commitment to the Western Balkans has fluctuated with the changing challenges faced by the EU itself, resulting in an inability to deliver on its promises. This situation is exemplified by Macedonia, which has been a candidate country since 2005 (Belloni, 2009).

Figure 2: The Western Balkans map (2021). Wikimedia Commons.

Another important factor is that the EU has fostered a dependence of domestic actors on its institutions, leading to the emergence of highly inefficient and corrupt political leaders (Dabrowski & Myachenkova, 2018). Nevertheless, in most cases, EU officials maintain good relations with these domestic actors and often show support for them, with soft reprimands being a rare occurrence. As a consequence, citizens of Western Balkan countries are beginning to conflate their grievances regarding corrupt and popular leaders with their perceptions of the EU (Horvat & Štiks, 2015).

In summary, the EU plays an active and powerful role in the domestic politics of the Western Balkans, particularly regarding the crucial agenda of the accession process. However, this role is often inconsistent and can be damaging to the EU's long-term standing in the region.

Internal crises and the enlargement fatigue

The crisis of the EU cannot be attributed to a single underlying explanation. Instead, various economic, geopolitical, and social issues contribute to the instability of the Union. While current global crises, such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, certainly impact EU member states, the fundamental problems began long before these geopolitical challenges emerged. The predicament facing the EU can be traced back to three main interconnected issues that reinforce one another (Caporaso, 2018).

Firstly, it all started with the Eurozone crisis. The adoption of a common currency in 1999 was hailed as one of the major milestones of EU integration (Frieden & Walter, 2017). However, just a decade later, this achievement transformed into a nightmare with significant consequences for the entire project. It is important to note that there is nothing unusual about a currency crisis occurring amid broader economic difficulties. What is unique, however, is that the EU, with the Euro as a common currency for the majority of its members, remains an organization of independent and sovereign states. Thus, the Euro crisis is distinctive as it did not affect one particular country but rather a group of countries that share a currency while differing in their overall economic characteristics (Frieden & Walter, 2017). Consequently, the crisis exposed two critical realities: there are two Europes, and there is a disbalance of power. The North and South are divided along cultural lines, approaches to work, and even religion, which inform their economic outputs (Caporaso, 2018). In the aftermath of the crash, it became evident that the North, particularly Germany, wielded stronger levers of power, which were used to allocate the burden of the crisis unevenly, often to the detriment of the South (Frieden & Walter, 2017). Hence, the Euro crisis revealed deep divisions between the center and periphery, along with the imbalances of power that accompany those divisions.

Figure 3: European Parliament (2018) by Frederic Köberl. Unsplash.

The economic troubles were soon compounded by Brexit and the refugee crisis, which together posed a significant challenge for the EU. The refugee crisis, peaking in 2015, was particularly problematic as it mirrored the dynamics of the Eurozone crisis, once again pitting the south, as front-line states, against the north, as rearguard states (Caporaso, 2018). This crisis also opened space for negotiation between these two regions, offering a chance to mend strained relations -particularly between Germany and Greece- wherein one provided material incentives to the other to manage the refugee flow and shield northern countries (Caporaso, 2018).

Lastly, in the wake of the economic and refugee crises came Brexit, further illustrating the difficult times for the EU as a political project (Caporaso, 2018). More significantly, Brexit demonstrated on a large scale -through one of Europe's most powerful countries- that being a member of the EU is not a universally accepted or "commonsensical" approach. This marked a turning point, showing that EU membership, once considered a given, could be fundamentally questioned.

Moving the goalposts and the long-term consequences

An important aspect of enlargement fatigue is its implicit nature. It is rarely overtly stated or formalized through new treaties or decisions halting enlargement. Instead, it manifests through small adjustments to existing protocols and measures, making the negotiation process feel never-ending and increasingly strict (Belloni, 2016). For example, the conditions placed on Croatia, the most recent member state, were already much harsher than those imposed on Poland. Moreover, the conditions that applied to Croatia are even stricter for newer prospective members (Emmert & Petrović, 2014). Although the official strategy has not changed, it has been reinterpreted in ways that reflect the implicit nature of enlargement fatigue (Emmert & Petrović, 2014), leading to growing frustration among Western Balkan countries as they navigate the negotiation process.

Figure 4: London pro-EU protest (2017). Wikimedia Commons.

The importance of this growing frustration cannot be overstated. One of the most concerning consequences of the stalled enlargement process is the rise of Euroscepticism among the citizens of the Western Balkans (Belloni, 2016). In all candidate and potential candidate countries, skepticism toward the EU has significantly increased over the past 15 years, particularly in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro (Belloni, 2016). This trend is especially remarkable given that these three countries were among the furthest along in the negotiation process. While domestic factors such as a lack of democracy and economic hardships play a role, the EU's inconsistent approach is also responsible for the growing disillusionment with EU integration (Sydoruk et al., 2022).

The rise of Euroscepticism in the Western Balkans, partially fueled by enlargement fatigue within the EU, has significant and long-lasting security and geopolitical consequences for both the region and the EU itself. First, it is essential to recognize that the EU and the Western Balkans are deeply economically interconnected, and the region's geographic location makes it critical to the EU's geostrategic objectives (Dabrowski & Myachenkova, 2018). Additionally, the EU has played a vital role in the creation and stabilization of the Western Balkans, fostering a dependency among domestic political actors (Belloni, 2019). However, as the EU scales back its active push for enlargement and reform, this void is being filled by other players. Russia, in particular, has emerged as a key actor, leveraging diplomacy, energy policy, cultural ties, and historical links to expand and consolidate its influence in the region (Panagiotou, 2021). Given the Western Balkans' strategic importance, positioned at the heart of Europe, the growing influence of Russia should be a concerning development for the EU.

Paradoxically, the resurgence of the Russian government's influence in the Western Balkans, along with its role in the war in Ukraine, has created fertile ground for reinvigorating the European integration process for the region. It seems that a dramatic geopolitical development was necessary to shake off the enlargement fatigue that had long affected traditionally skeptical EU countries (Szolucha, 2010). In response to the Russian government's actions, the EU has fast-tracked Ukraine's integration process, opening accession negotiations in 2024 (Council of the European Union, n.d.). This momentum has also had a positive impact on the Western Balkans, with Bosnia and Herzegovina being granted official candidate status (European Commission, n.d.). This renewed focus could represent a turning point for the EU’s approach to enlargement, as geopolitical necessity begins to align with the stalled aspirations of the Western Balkans.

Figure 5: European Commission building (2018) by Dimitris Vetsikas. Pixabay.

Conclusion

The European Union’s engagement with the Western Balkans, though initially promising, has been marred by inconsistencies and shifting priorities. The rise of enlargement fatigue, driven by internal crises within the EU and increasingly stringent accession requirements, has resulted in frustration and growing Euroscepticism in the region. This dissatisfaction has opened the door for other geopolitical actors, notably Russia, to increase their influence. Nevertheless, the recent geopolitical shifts, particularly the war in Ukraine, have revitalized EU integration efforts, offering a potential path forward for the Western Balkans. As the EU reassesses its role in the region, it must find a balance between addressing its internal challenges and honoring its commitments to enlargement, lest it risk further alienating the Western Balkan states and losing its influence in this strategic and crucial area.

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