History of the Singular Italian Trusteeship on Somalia

Somalia is an Eastern country in the Horn of Africa. It is a federal republic with a particular and long history. Its territory is characterized by “geographic extremes”, mostly flat with vast savannah and semi-desertic zones, making the country’s terrain generally arid. The climate is dry and hot in the internal areas, while it is hot and humid in the coastal regions. Somali people are clan-based Muslims,  and Islam is the country’s official religion. It is interesting to highlight that a high percentage of the population is nomadic or seminomadic, about three-fifths of the total.  This segment of the population primarily engages in nomadic pastoralism and agropastoralism, economic activities deeply rooted in Somalia's historical and cultural traditions (Janzen & Lewis, 2024). Somalia's modern history until the mid-19th century is marked by a dual trajectory: the expansion of Somali populations from the northern regions into the interior, and the dynamic evolution of Muslim trading centers along the coast (Lewis, 1988). After the colonial parenthesis, which started at the end of the 19th century, with the division of the Italian and British Somaliland, the country went through long phases of political turmoil (Gentili, 1995). The years after the country’s independence in 1960 were marked by the dictatorship of  Siyad Barre and social unrest, with the still unsolved conflict over Somaliland (Reviglio, 2014).  

Looking at the recent history of Somalia, the Italian colonial phase stands as a distinct and significant chapter. It is well-documented that Italy's involvement in the Second World War resulted in the loss of its colonial possessions, including Somalia. Although initially allied with the Axis powers, Italy switched allegiance to the Allied side in 1943. However, at the end of the post-war peace treaties, the  United Nations (UN) commissioned a trusteeship of Somalia to Italy to lead the country to its independence. This case is particularly interesting since it is the only one where a defeated nation got such treatment and commission from the UN. Scholars have advanced several possible explanations for this peculiar case, but no official clarification has yet been given (Reviglio, 2014). 

The decision to analyze this specific topic came from the realization that it remains relatively unexplored and often underlooked in historical analyses of both Somalia and Italian colonialism itself, with a consequential lack of criticism advanced to it. It is often dismissed as irrelevant and erroneously relegated to the distant past. This is mainly related to the fact that it started with the early governments of the country and was prosecuted by the fascist dictatorship of Benito  Mussolini. A public debate about the necessity and importance of decolonization never happened in the country. This implied that a large portion of people does not know that Italy was a colonial power that had considerable responsibilities in the African continent. Moreover, the colonial consciousness became something deeply ideological, which is still today mostly remembered publicly to either criticize fascism or praise it by its rightist supporters. Italian colonialism is perceived as something far different from the English or French ones: while it was of course different in its structure and dynamics, it was not less horrendous and harmful.  

Figure 1: A. Osman, (2004), Exodus. 

In recent years, there has been a surge in scholarly interest in Italian colonialism, with researchers critically engaging with the primary sources, mostly those produced by the fascist regime itself. A significant lack of sources is, therefore, still perceived while researching the topic. One of the reasons for this can be found in Calchi Novati’s definition of Italian colonialism as something that “lacked impetus and legitimacy” (Reviglio, 2014). Nevertheless, even though the literature on its colonialism is growing in Italy and abroad, the Italian Trusteeship on Somalia (A.F.I.S., standing for Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia) is still broadly unknown or ignored. It is interesting to underline that even in academic courses on African history, the AFIS was almost never mentioned. This seemed quite dismaying, considering the particularity of the topic, both historically and symbolically. Thereby, this brief analysis will try to assess the specificities of the case and its developments.  

The recent history of Somalia  

Morris highlighted the typology of expansion led by the Somali, which he defined as a «disjointed series of clan and lineage movements» (Morris, 1988, 32), mainly characterized by the exploration of new pastures. A relevant consequence of these movements was, for instance, the «prolonged struggle» (Morris, 1988, 25) between the Abyssinian Kingdom and several Islamic states, which reached its peak in the Ethiopian – Adal War (1529-1543). After 1850, Somalia started being contained among different powers, France, Britain, and Italy, together with the involvement of Egypt and Abyssinia. With the “Scramble for Africa”, the different colonial powers divided the nation between themselves. The British interests were mainly in the Aden Gulf and Northern Somaliland as strategic areas, which became British Somaliland. The other sides mainly were looking at the Red Sea: initially claimed by France, with its Franco-Ethiopian trading company issued in Obock, Somalia was later revendicated by Italy. The country was formally colonized by Italy just in 1905. Its colonialism was not driven by specific economic or strategic interests, but mostly by the imperial necessity of colonizing, where Somalia was one of the last free areas left after the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885.  

The initial stage of colonialism in Somalia, as well as in the rest of the Horn of Africa, was managed by chartered companies. In 1866 Vincenzo Filonardi, who owned the V. Filonardi & Co. company,  took over some seaports on the Somali coast, including the one of Mogadishu. Its nominal power over the coast was maintained thanks to an alliance between Italy and the Zanzibar sultanate which had been stipulated in 1885, together with English accordance. The particular strategy employed by Filonardi was one of partnership and interest creation with Italian investors. Meanwhile, Filonardi started building a power system by bonding with the Zanzibar sultan and trying to impede firearms commerce and presence in the area, which had a relevant role in the competitions between clans. Subsequently, he fortified its presence in the area by stipulating protectorate deals with the sultans of Majerteen and Hobyo. These de iure agreements did not actually provide any sort of control over  Somalia: they just let the protector manage some external affairs of the sultans, who kept their power and independence. Anyway, the company’s tentative to strengthen its role in the region and to move forward in the country failed. The failure is related to the weak entrance approach adopted by the Filonardi company and the lack of funding from the Bank of Rome. This was later the reason for another company’s bankruptcy, the Anonymous Commercial Society of Benadir, owned by Antonio Cecchi. From this point on, the Italian Navy took over the expansion into the area, yet without achieving substantial territorial gains. However, the Italian military's attempts at further expansion were met with fierce resistance and counterattacks from the Somali population. This was the time of the so-called ‘Somali psychosis’, which spread between Italian soldiers, and it was also one of the first times when brutal violence was used in Somalia: an «unrestricted punitive expedition» was realized by General Sorrentino and two Askari groups coming from Eritrea, already formally colonized in 1890. Calchi Novati has pointed out the significance of this action: it is at the origins of the religious conflict between catholic and orthodox Askari and Somali, who were, and are, mostly Muslims. This hatred has long been exploited by the Italians for their own military expansion. Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight that in this context another fundamental character of Somalia’s history arose, Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, the Mullah, leader of the resistance against the colonial powers (Calchi Novati, 2019).  

The Italian government overtook the Benadir in 1905. Rapidly, the government had direct control of the ‘Southern Italian Somalia’ while a commissioner was imposed on Northern Italian Somalia,  located in Aden. To eradicate insecurity and strengthen Italy’s position in the area, the colony of  Somalia was officially announced in 1908 by the Italian government. Still, refusal and conflict were advanced against the Italian colonial presence, which was just fortified during the Fascist dictatorship in the country (1922-1943), with its imperial aspirations. The country’s presence in Somalia was “not virtual anymore”: its political and military dimensions were carried out brutally. Throughout the whole time, smuggling and disorder were a daily occurrence, in response to the Italian initiatives attempted to subjugate the Somalis. Soon, the country became a base to get to Ethiopia, and this is interestingly visible through a brief analysis of the infrastructure realized in the country (Calchi Novati, 2019). 

Figure 2: A.I. Maxmuud, (2013), Tradition. 

The Italian Administration of Somalia 

The Italian colonies were occupied by the British between 1941 and 1943. This was a direct effect of Italy’s progressive loss in World War II. The discussion about the status of the former Italian colonies was debated between the winning powers. Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia were initially controlled by the Allied powers. The areas were strategic though, and managing them became a complicated issue, which took three years to be successfully solved. The initial proposition was a trusteeship directed by a coalition, to be formally managed by the UN. The issue rapidly became another one of the many on the stage of the Cold War. Therefore, several solutions were proposed during the discussions held on the topic: the Allies’ urgency was to use these areas as containment zones, mostly in the case of Libya, driven by concerns over potential contact with Soviet-influenced areas. While Italy kept implementing an appeasement policy,  trying to prove its reliability, it was generally distrusted. Despite this shift in geopolitical priorities, Italy persistently asserted its claims to its former colonies, emphasizing the historical legitimacy of its presence in Africa. This specific element was retrieved through a dialectic that accentuated the distinction between pre-fascist and fascist Italian colonialism and the role of the country in World War II after 1943, with its alignment with the Allies. Through this initial approach, Italy strictly claimed Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia, only accepting to bargain the ‘intensity’ of its sovereignty. In this environment, the involved and related African states were not included in the decision process, except for a survey with the Eritreans. The Ethiopian report on  Italian colonial officials included a list of war crimes was not even discussed, even though  Ethiopia had filed it to the United Nations. Somali nationalists also went to the UN to claim their rights and were, again, ignored. For Western countries, the possibility of a temporary Italian administration over its former colonies emerged as a viable option which was also supported by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the strategic importance of these areas led to a stalemate situation. The Paris Conference of 1946 represented an attempt to manage the complex colonial situation, but ultimately proved unsuccessful in reaching a lasting resolution. Several options were advanced during the conference: for instance, USSR’s minister Molotov suggested a double trusteeship on every Italian possession, with Italy and one of the War’s winners managing every country. The  Convention was a failure and, in the end, was just limited to a formal Italian renouncement to its former colonies. The peace treaty was signed to close the Conference in 1947. It stated that Italy had officially lost its colonies which were going to be managed by the major powers for one year.  Moreover, it was stipulated that, if a mutually agreeable solution could not be reached within one year, the decision would have been restored by the United Nations (Calchi Novati, 2019). In 1948 a compromise was still missing: Italy advanced its position in a new memorandum, even though its weight was irrelevant within the UN since it was not a member and therefore had no voting rights. The strategic importance of the questioned areas has been already highlighted. Libya was indeed critical for Great Britain and the United States of America. Eritrea was the most discussed country: it was key to the United States as well as Ethiopia, which was favored by Great Britain. It is quite evident that the issue was decisive for international interests and order: another conference was held in Paris, in 1948, and it was again unsuccessful. Italy tried adopting an appeasement and pleasing approach to the UN and major powers, formally attesting its will of siding for the independence of  Libya and Eritrea. Regarding Somalia, its approach was different, while still using the scenario to show its reliability, Italy’s representatives exposed their inclination for the country’s independence while retaining on time. 

While Libya was formally divided between Great Britain and France, Eritrea continued being a demanding scenario, only solved in 1950 with a formal federation with Ethiopia under American supervision. Somalia was the area where Italy was accommodated. With an important UN session,  on the 21st of November 1949, an Italian Trusteeship over Somalia was declared. It was approved with 48 votes in favor, 1 vote contrary (Ethiopia), and 9 abstentions (France, New Zealand, Sweden,  Yugoslavia, and Soviet Block). To understand these results, it is important to highlight that Italy was one of the founding countries of the North Atlantic Alliance in April 1949 (Calchi Novati, 2019). The Italian  Trusteeship on Somalia (AFIS), issued for the former Italian Somaliland, was officially declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations with resolution number 381, on 2 December 1950. 

The resolution states that Italy had to lead the country towards its complete independence, in a fixed period of ten years from 1950. Reviglio della Veneria highlighted the peculiarities of this trusteeship agreement, mentioning it as the result of an unprecedented relationship between Italy, Somalia, and the United Nations. In his work, alongside many other scholars who have investigated this subject, the author highlights the significant influence of the prevailing international climate and the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts on the unfolding events in Somalia. The terms implied in the agreement are the ones of the UN dialectics and are mainly focused on the diplomatic and developmental spheres. The encouragement of respect for differences is indeed accentuated together with the function of Italy’s role. As Reviglio emphasizes «the UN represented the ‘watchdog’ of the entire project» (Reviglio, 2014). This UN supervision was meant to keep a “smooth” relationship between the local population and structures and the Italian administration. As ruled by Article 8 of the Treaty, the UN exercised surveillance on some of the key sectors in the country, such as economic and financial development, education, labor, social advancement, and the transfer of government functions (United Nations, 1952). 

Figure 3: A.C. Nuur, (2013), Farmer.

Impact and Consequences

An analysis of the effective work realized by the Italian administration is necessary to comprehend if it was successful or not. The initial climate was tense: hostility was spread, evidently represented by some riots organized by the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1950 (Reviglio, 2014). Given this context, together with a relevant lack of data on the country’s structures and population, the administration’s work was demanding. The cultural difference was also a gap difficult to operate with, considering the Italian approach: an interesting example of this distance of ideas is the one highlighted by the Bank of Italy’s reports, accessed by Reviglio. Indeed, according to experts «agriculture was limited to small segments of Somali society. Moreover, agricultural activities were considered by the native population as non noble in comparison with sheep farming». (ASBI, nd). The conflict between approaches is evident in these kinds of official reports. This strife was worsened by the specific administrators who operated in the trusteeship, who were mostly former fascist colonial agents. This implicated a fascist approach to the Somali as well as to their own work, recalling fascist propaganda. As Reviglio mentioned this perspective conflicted strongly with the initial plan adopted by the Italians, who intended to implement self-government in the country. The difficulties in realizing these intentions were firstly hindered by the stance of the administration’s personnel. The Italian ambassador Fornari’s declaration of 1954  explains well this element: «they do not want to accept that they are not the masters any longer» (Tripodi, 1999).  The Italian attempt to set a form of self-government in Somalia was almost necessary for the country itself. While Italy's desire to retain its presence in Somalia was partly motivated by commercial and demographic interests, it was primarily driven by ideological considerations tied to the legacy of its colonial empire. A brief look at Italy’s condition in 1950 is sufficient to understand that the country did not have the necessary resources to lead another country to its independence. Its intervention structure and failure clearly represent these conditions. 

The main interventions realized by the AFIS were on the economy, education, and political system of Somalia. First and foremost, the attempt at an agricultural system was implemented. It has already been noted that the country’s soil is predominantly infertile. This was of course not helped by the  Somali’s attitude towards pastoralism, the main economic activity. A subsequent lack of workforce in this area was also a significant issue. It was later partially faced by the administration creating cooperatives of Somali which had to control available fertile surfaces. This sector was also sustained by water wells constructions. Limited attempts at cooperation with the Somali population were undertaken, but there were gaps between their subsistence agriculture and the Italians’ skewed ambitions of productive agriculture. One interesting attempt by the AFIS administration was the sector of bananas. Mostly cultivated in southern Somalia, after WWII bananas became the main crop of the country. The production, organized with a partial mechanization of the process, was set through concessions.  Nevertheless, the sector was not implemented with a perspective on the Somali: it was instead monopolized by the Italian “Azienda Monopolio Banane” (A.M.B.). This typology of setting represents again the distortion and colonial pattern of the Italian Trusteeship in Somalia.  Unfortunately, the bananas commerce started in Somalia was not even productive: the established price for these bananas exceeded the prevailing market rates. Some attempts were also initiated toward the diversification of Somalia’s agriculture and economy, without extended success. The interventions of AFIS were indeed not well planned, a structural procedure was missing since the beginning, together with the capital to realize it. Consequently, the attempts to boost agricultural production have generally been unsuccessful and self-sufficiency was not reached. The Italian boost can be seen as one of the reasons why later Somalia had to rely on international aid (Reviglio, 2014). 

Regarding the economic sector, Somalia’s internal market was not very interconnected. While several  bazaars were active, a relevant number of goods were imported. The export was also just partially implemented, and about 64% of it went from Mogadishu to Italy. Reviglio has stressed the significance of the balance of payment’s deficit as an added difficulty for the AFIS to work out (Reviglio, 2014).  Nevertheless, it could also be argued that the colonial structures and the semi-colonial ones adopted during the trusteeship were not advantageous. Furthermore, the criteria adopted in many of the analyses regarding the Somalian economy and notoriously the UN reports keep facing these issues with Western standards. Apart from the possible criticism of scholarly methods, the sources show that the Italian administration tried to build an economic system. The Bank of Italy’s reports states that economically, one of the first challenges for the AFIS was to foster a productive economic system that could be sustainable and support the other sectors. Nevertheless, many of the attempts initiated by the administration were generally late and inefficient. In the background of most interventions, there were Italian companies and venture interests. Therefore, it can be argued that the AFIS  economic intervention was not extensively successful (Reviglio, 2014).  

Figure 4: C.A. Cali, (2013), Untitled. 

Another sector that had been emphasized by the UN treaty of 1949 was the issue of education. Article 4 of the agreement highlighted the administration’s responsibility «to promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end undertakes to establish as rapidly as possible a system of public education» (United Nations, 1952). This had to be urgently done in an extended way, to provide the country with qualified personnel and broad access to education for students in the whole country, as well as abroad: article 4 also highlighted the necessity of sustainability for future independent Somalia (United Nations, 1952). The Somali illiteracy grade was extremely high, and the different systems implemented throughout the time made it difficult to improve these rates. Italy’s intervention in the sector was planned, at first with a five years strategy, together with the international organizations connected to the United Nations (Reviglio, 2014). 

Lastly, an analysis of the attempts to deal with the political structure in the country seems necessary and is relevant to understand the shift toward Somalia’s independence. The distance between the Italian traditional and structured idea of politics and the split and dispersed nature of  Somali society and its management is meaningful. This had evident consequences on the national relationships and interventions, as well as the terms implemented by the UN, the AFIS, and many of the available sources. Apart from the scattered political relationships the Italian administration attempted an institutional organization of the country. It was divided into 28 districts, while the administration itself was set up in 17 administrative departments. A Territorial Council was formed in 1950, with 35 councilors, 28 of whom were locals. The body had consultative and representative functions, directed at internal affairs. As Reviglio underscores, the election of the Council’s members was managed by the Italian administration until 1955. Additionally, several institutions were built to handle different economic sectors and mainly served as connectors between the administration, investors, and civil society. Finally, it is interesting to highlight that the power relationships between the Italian administration and the Somali society and representatives changed slightly after 1954. Indeed, in that year the first elections during the Italian administration were held, and a significant predominance of the Somali Youth League was registered. This shift in power is well represented by the Legislative Assembly, first elected in 1956. Its structure was better balanced. Out of the 70 seats, 60 were occupied by Somali, while 4 were held by the Italians, 4 by the Arabs, 1 by the Indians, and 1 by the Pakistanis.  Internally the SYL kept a broad majority, with 43 seats in the Assembly. In 1957, two Committees were created by the Italian administration to draft a new Constitution: these were both composed of Italian experts, through the expedient of the expertise lack among Somalis. The model of this new  Constitution was the Italian one of 1948. Reviglio stressed that the Italians made the mistake of believing in the necessity of removing the clan lineages from the political institutions of Somalia.  This, together with the distinctions and legal aspects introduced by the merging process with the British  Somaliland, led the 1960 Constitution and its institutions to be «superstructures» distant from  Somalia’s realities (Reviglio, 2014).

Conclusive Remarks: Independence and Responsibilities

Somalia became independent the 1st of July 1960. Its independence was accepted by the UN following the Somali government’s pressure. Interestingly it was also fostered by Italy, unlike in 1950. The climate after independence is described as tense. It is compelling and highly symbolic, according to  Reviglio, that Italy was the only country to recognize General Siyad Barre’s government (Reviglio, 2014). Reviglio argued that Italy made great efforts to prepare Somalia for independence, considering its modest possibilities. Even though some positive outcomes were actually achieved, in a ten-year period it is clear that such a trusteeship was given to Italy for higher strategic interests and diplomatic reasons. 

Overall, the Italian administration has failed to face the duties established by UN resolution 381. Italy’s position in 1949 was already mentioned and is key to understanding why the Italian  Trusteeship of Somalia was the only trusteeship given by the UN to a country that had lost its colonies.  A critical discussion of Italy’s colonial role and responsibilities seems necessary, together with a more straightforward evaluation of its colonial experience, without passing the buck to the fascist period.  It appears urgent to implement a more serious discourse on the UN’s responsibility for giving the management of a country to a former colonial country, that was also going through its own reconstruction, which seems an immoral and irresponsible geopolitical decision. The failure of the  Italian intervention clearly shows the myopia of the AFIS mandate and the management of post-WWII politics. In conclusion, Aruffo’s statement remains somewhat of an admonishment for a more critical evaluation of international balances and responsibilities, as in the case of the peculiar UN  trusteeship mandate to Italy on Somalia. He states that aside from the heavy historic colonial inheritance, Italian governments have had huge responsibilities in the political developments and economic destructuring of Somalia (Aruffo, 1994). 

Bibliographical References

Aruffo, A. (1994), Dossier Somalia, Datanews.

ASBI, Bank of Italy, Studi, Pratt. n. 256, fascicoli 1,2. 

Calchi Novati G. P. (2019), L’Africa d’Italia, Carocci

Gentili, A. M. (1995), Il leone e il cacciatore.

Lewis, I. M.  (1988), A Modern History of Somalia, Westview.

Janzen, J. H.A. and Lewis, I. M. (2024) Somalia, Encyclopedia Britannica,  

(https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia)

Reviglio della Veneria, M. (2014) The United Nations, Italy and Somalia: a ‘sui generis’ relation 1948-1969,  Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Utrecht University

Tripodi, P., (1999) The colonial legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: from colonial administration to Operation Restore Hope, Macmillan & St. Martin’s Press

United Nations, (1952) Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland Under  Italian Administration, Treaty Series, Volume 118

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