Uncertainty in Bilateral International (Disarmament) Negotiations
Introduction
Uncertainty is inherent in human life. We face uncertainty daily, from weather forecasts to others’ actions. People usually view uncertainty as adverse and, therefore, try to reduce it. However, uncertainty can also be attractive and beneficial since it encourages individuals to seek enjoyment and positivity. For instance, in negotiation contexts, uncertainty is often associated with bargaining failures: uncertainty about missing information and mistrust can be an obstacle for parties’ collaboration and impede the achievement of a durable agreement. Despite that, uncertainty might also be essential for reaching favorable outcomes since it might induce people to seek much more information about the other parties’ interests and concerns, which are vital data for avoiding failures in bargaining. Hence, uncertainty is not the cause of negotiations’ failure but a means to avoid negative results caused by incomplete information.
The term uncertainty detains numerous shades of meaning which in the context of negotiations are, according to Kydd (2012), mistrust, uncertainty about the state of the world, private information about bargaining leverage, and, in line with Sondak et al. (2013) uncertainty of interests, inclusion, and identity. Uncertainty, arising from missing information, might cause the failure of negotiations because it results in the lack of trust between negotiators. Consequently, it becomes an obstacle to states' collaboration and an impediment to reaching durable agreements. An excellent example in denuclearization negotiations is the US-North Korea talks about nuclear programs which have been plagued by mistrust and uncertainty about one party’s interest and values. In this case, the negotiations failed and ended up deadlocked. Nonetheless, uncertainty might be an incentive to seek further information about one party’s interests, avoid information asymmetry and contribute to a positive progress of negotiations. For instance, during the SALT I talks, the US missed information about the URSS missile capabilities. Subsequently, they decided to gather more data during the meetings and make the Soviet intentions more transparent, hence, the setting of an agenda beneficial for the following negotiations.
After defining the notion of uncertainty and discussing some of its dominant types, this article will demonstrate that uncertainty can be both positive and negative in international bilateral bargaining contexts. Two case studies on bilateral disarmament negotiations will be provided to comprehend this thesis better, namely US-North Korea and US-URSS (SALT I) talks.
Defining Uncertainty
Figure 1: Uncertainty, (2021). University of Chicago.
Uncertainty is usually interpreted as a "mere lack of absolute sureness" and "a state of doubt" (Collins, 2015). However, it is a much more complex concept whose definition has multiple shades. For instance, constructivists define uncertainty as the indeterminacy of a socially constructed world (ibid). Cognitivists say it is confusion in decision-making processes (Rathbun, 2007). Rationalists instead define uncertainty as ignorance of complete information during the bargaining game (ibid).
Research on bargaining indicates that the effectiveness and efficiency of negotiating are related to the degree of uncertainty experienced by the involved parties (Babcock et al.,1995). To give an idea, the presence or absence of uncertainty may reduce the possibility of positive outcomes of the bargaining and the attainment of a contract zone (ibid), which, in negotiation terms, is also known as the "Zone of Possible Agreement" (ZOPA). A ZOPA involves a non-physical place and area where the negotiating parties find common ground (Halton, 2020), and it can only be achieved if the parties detain overlapped prospects regarding bargaining and understand one another's values, concerns, and interests (ibid). Nonetheless, in line with Mnookin (2003), negotiating parties may fail to reach an agreement even when they find common ground.
For instance, one reason bargaining is believed to fail is the parties' reluctance to fully disclose information on their interests and their reservation value, which in bargaining terminology indicates the least favorable point at which parties will welcome a deal (ibid). Therefore, lack of disclosure and, as rationalists call it, ignorance of complete information about parties' intentions and values cause the emergence of uncertainty between them and a consequential failure of bargaining. Before analyzing why and how uncertainty plays a positive or negative role in international negotiation, it is fundamental to define the different subtypes of uncertainty discussed by Kydd (2012) and Sondak et al. (2013).
Types of Uncertainty
Uncertainty in negotiation is frequently divided into subtypes. Kydd (2012) points out that uncertainty is differentiated into three types: private information about the parties' bargaining leverage, mistrust between the negotiating parties, and uncertainty about the state of the world. Additionally, Sondak et al. (2013) define uncertainty as related to identity, interests, and inclusion.
Figure 2: Asymmetries and Mistrust, (2018). WIX.
According to Kydd (2012), private information about bargaining leverage is the most common type of uncertainty in negotiation. It involves the absence of certainty about relative power and usually occurs in trade settlements when a side is perceived to be stronger than the other. The latter can demand more favorable terms that the other party is willing to accept (ibid). In such a case, power asymmetry comes into play. Kydd (2012 p. 284) also defines uncertainty as mistrust affirming that lack of trust arises when one party suspects that the other is "bargaining in bad faith." Consequently, the former can bluff on whether an agreement is achieved.
Mistrust can occur when one party is uncertain of the other party's objectives. In this regard, in peace talks one negotiating side can use a ceasefire to buy time and probably renew its threat (ibid). Hence, uncertainty concerns the level of trustworthiness.
The last type identified by Kydd (2012 p. 284) is uncertainty about the state of the world involving questions about the best course of action and the potential for mutual benefits. An excellent illustration provided by Kydd (2012) relates to the context of climate change negotiations. As it occurred during the Kyoto treaty, one party may detain concerns about which policy is better to deal with the issue (ibid). Otherwise, it is likely to occur in free-trade contexts in which uncertainty is about whether mutual gains will be assured or not (Kennan et al., 1993).
Figure 3: Uncertainty of Identity, (2012). The Daily Omnivore.
As stated above, Sondak et al. (2013) declare that uncertainty might regard the level of compatibility of one party in the negotiation context, which they call uncertainty of identity. In multilateral and bilateral negotiations, a lack of homogeneity in interests, goals, and priorities may lead one party to identify itself outside the group (ibid). In intra-team negotiations, individuals can reduce ambiguity by assessing similarities with colleagues and, subsequently, a salient shared identity is more likely to be reached (ibid). Sondak et al. (2013) also discuss the notion of uncertainty of inclusion which is related to the strategy of coalition formation. When coalitions occur, a party needs to be concerned about other parties’ coalition, its potential alliances and its own inclusion in one of them (ibid). The last subtype of uncertainty Sondak et al. (2013) researched is the uncertainty of interests. This type answers the question, "What does everyone want?" (Sondak et al., 2013 p. 292).
In multilateral and bilateral negotiations, uncertainty of interest is higher than in intra-team bargaining, considering that the number of individuals increases as the number of issues, perspectives, and information to digest (ibid). It is thus indispensable to underline that this type is decisive in disarmament negotiation. Promoting information sharing and transparency on nations’ intentions is a means to build confidence and trust (Rajen, 2000), without which it would be impossible to maintain a nuclear treaty (Ruzicka et al., 2010). Such talks involve and concern the most destructive weapons that human beings have ever invented (ibid), and which is to be considered a massive threat for all humanity. Thereby, as it will be demonstrated further, what Kydd (2012) defines as mistrust and Sondak et al. (2013) describe as the uncertainty of interest detains a prominent role in bilateral disarmament negotiation. After defining some types of uncertainty, it is feasible to analyze when uncertainty is damaging for international negotiations.
Uncertainty as Negative
Uncertainty, as earlier stated, is usually said to be one of the major causes of failed negotiations. As Nelson (2011) affirms, uncertainty about opponents' intentions and capabilities is a formidable obstacle to states' collaboration, and mostly it impedes reaching durable agreements because it influences how actors take decisions. In line with Underdal (1983 p. 186), uncertainty is a "subjective feeling" regarding missing parts of information that might be fundamental for the counterparts to implement final decisions. It is undeniable that Underdal's explanation of uncertainty perfectly fits the definition of uncertainty mentioned above and provided by rationalists (Rathbun, 2007).
Figure 4: Trust in Face to Face Diplomacy, (2018). University of Birmingham.
Ignorance of complete information, or private information, can cause failed negotiation since the loss of complete information about one party's positions and objectives leads negotiators to be uncertain and negotiations to be deadlocked (Persson, 1994). In this respect, deadlocks play a vital role in negotiations' outcomes. Persson (1994) and Narlikar (2010) point out that deadlocks are a state of crisis caused by parties' inability to respond quickly and cooperatively to others' moves and proposals.
Thus, as Stenelo (1972) mentions, a deadlock is a sterile non-agreement state marked by a deficient level of progression and advancement. Deadlocks, indeed, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty about the information provided by one of the negotiating parties (ibid) and by a consequential low level of trust among actors, which is a vital component for negotiations' positive outcomes (Savolainen et al., 2018). Thereby, bargaining outcomes are highly dependent on the presence of trust and information sharing (Butler, 1999).
To better understand how uncertainty is interconnected with deadlocks and unfavorable to bargaining outcomes, it is essential to provide an example of bilateral international negotiations, which in this case will be the US and North Korea negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Denuclearization Negotiations between the US and North Korea
In 1985, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a state party in exchange for the URSS’ aid with nuclear technology. However, in 2003 it proclaimed its resignation (Carrel-Billiard et al. 2010) since the nation claimed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was not impartial during the inspections on nuclear weapons (Han, 2000). The IAEA, in 1992, during check-ups, discovered proof that the DRPK was misrepresenting its obligations under the treaty (IAEA, 1997).
The trust gap started as soon as the DPRK withdrew the NPT after implementing its nuclear arsenal (Wanis-St. John, 2012) and from the unsuccessful execution of the US-DPRK bilateral agreement, the “Agreed Framework.” The latter was signed in 1994 (Cha, 2004) and collapsed in 2002 because of mistrust and uncertainty. De facto, North Korea stopped the plutonium-based bomb but kept carrying out other activities, probably regarding the uranium enrichment plan (Kim, 2014).
Figure 5: Bill Clinton and Ryutaro Hashimoto, (1996). Wikimedia.
The bilateral talks focused on limiting North Korea’s nuclear program began with the Clinton Administration in April 1996 and were pursued by the Obama administration with the “Leap Day Deal” (Manyin et al., 2021). Nevertheless, the US uncertainty about whether North Korea’s nuclear program has been designed for leverage or existed for legitimate security concerns has always plagued the talks (Cha, 2004), which continue to be deadlocked. The leading cause, in agreement with Kim (2014), is to be found in uncertainty arising from asymmetric information and distrust that occurred between the two states during the bargaining process. Following Kim (2014), the missing information is somewhat soft for the US rather than North Korea, considering that democratic states detain more transparent intentions than non-democratic governments. Democratic leaders, such as Barack Obama, cannot easily conceal private information about future threats or any other type of threat of deception because of the possible domestic political oppositions (Schultz, 2004; Fearon, 1994).
On the contrary, non-democratic governments, such as North Korea, have little to no opposition and more control of the information about) political and military weaknesses (Schultz, 2004). The latter, indeed, during the bilateral talks, has not been self-explanatory and has not been willing to improve transparency (Kim, 2014), giving rise to mutual mistrust and current negotiation’s deadlock. As a result, Washington kept a high hostile policy centered on profound mistrust (Faure, 2012), avoiding further positive progress of the talks.
Once it was considered uncertainty as a negative element to bilateral denuclearization negotiations' outcomes, it is also fundamental to demonstrate why and how uncertainty might positively impact bargaining results.
Uncertainty as Positive
Uncertainty in the negotiation process might be advantageous, if not crucial, for achieving the best possible results (Sondak et al., 2013). As stated above, uncertainty can shrink the inclination to build trust and share information genuinely. Despite that, uncertainty can also encourage negotiators to seek further information and better outcomes (Essa et al., 2016).
Figure 5: Embracing Uncertainty, (2024). IILMBlog.
As a matter of fact, in agreement with Sondak et al. (2013), one's level of certainty influences how someone processes information. When people have a strong sense of confidence and are frequently certain, they may process information in a heuristic way, relying on well-developed associations or general-principle, to evaluate data and make decisions (ibid). Conversely, individuals may process information more profoundly or systematically due to their encounter with uncertainty (Chen et al., 1999; Tiedens et al., 2001). Systematic information processing is a significant aspect in reaching integrative, or mutually or collectively beneficial negotiation agreements (Sondak et al., 2013) because in seeking information, uncertain actors try to reduce their degree of uncertainty about one's interests and lack of trust in their judgments (Weary et al., 1997). Additionally, negotiators who thoroughly digest information are more likely to ask the right questions, listen to the responses and identify chances for mutually advantageous trade-offs (Sondak et al., 2013). Therefore, it is fair to affirm that uncertainty may assist the construction of integrative negotiation agreements because it enhances systematic thinking, which, in turn, reinforces negotiation performance through incentivized reasoning (Essa et al., 2016). Therefore, what makes negotiations collapse is not the uncertainty itself but rather the lack of information provided by the parties. For this reason, uncertainty might be a means to avoid the downfall of international talks. It is, however, pivotal to analyze the US-URSS disarmament negotiations (SALT I) to apprehend this thesis and how uncertainty positively shapes negotiations.
Disarmament Negotiations Between the US and USSR (SALT I)
The decade of the 1970s stands out as a time when rigorous and partially successful negotiations on strategic weapons limitation took place. The US and Soviet Union agreed that one of the critical goals of the discussions would be to develop and maintain stable strategic deterrence between them by limiting the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive arms to reduce the possibility of nuclear war and avoid one sides’ military advantage (Garthoff, 1978; Pierre 1972). By the time the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) started in Helsinki in late 1969, both the US and the Soviet Union had agreed on the importance of maintaining parity, mutual deterrence, and strategic stability (Garthoff, 1978). Thus, the two nations established a fundamental strategic conceptual framework for SALT, which was reflected in the later SALT I accords (Garthoff, 1978; Pierre, 1972).
Figure 6: The First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, (1969). Arms Control Association.
However, the SALT I negotiations had been beset by a high level of uncertainty about capabilities and missing information. Both Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capabilities were unknown to the United States (Nelson, 2013; Garthoff, 1982). More specifically, the Johnson Administration’s uncertainty was exacerbated by the capability of the ABM named Galosh, which the US assumed was built up as an extensive research program to protect Moscow (Nelson, 2013). Regarding MIRV, the US made a considerable endeavor using the missing information to benefit those who were hostile against the MIRV limitations by concluding that the URSS was much further in the development programs than it actually was (ibid). On the other side, the Soviets had similar uncertainties about the US ABM capabilities (Newhouse, 1989). Therefore, to overcome the obstacle of uncertainty, the US chose to employ an effective strategy for managing uncertainty and, consequently, the SALT I negotiations outcome. Nelson (2013) argues that the US concluded that gathering information during the meetings together with allowing flexibility for the proposals would have been advantageous for the talks. It can be argued, in agreement with Nelson (2013, that thanks to uncertainty, the US found a way to foster positive outcomes of the negotiation: using the first round of talks to seek as much information as possible about USSR positions and make the Soviet intentions more transparent.
Whereby, uncertainty in SALT I talks positively impacted the bargaining outcome, considering that the set agenda included a general range of topics that would benefit further negotiations (Newhouse, 1989).
Conclusion
This article has explored the multifaceted role of uncertainty in international bilateral negotiations, examining both its negative and positive implications. While uncertainty can hinder effective communication, create mistrust, and lead to deadlocks, it can also serve as a catalyst for more informed and collaborative decision-making.
By understanding the nature of uncertainty and developing effective strategies for managing it, negotiators can improve their chances of reaching successful and durable agreements. Recommendations form managing uncertainty ar thus as follows:
Transparency and information sharing
Third-party mediation (neutral mediators)
Structured negotiation techniques (such as interest-based bargaining or mediation)
Building trust gradually
Recognizing the value of uncertainty (embracing uncertainty as a natural part of the negotiation process to approach challenges with a more adaptive mindset).
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