Why did China Help Italy During Covid-19? An Analysis From a Neorealist and Soft Power Perspective.
Introduction
Covid-19 has changed people's lives in recent years and deeply affected relations between states. During the pandemic, numerous nations offered aid to other countries, which, at first glance, appeared to be a step towards genuine international cooperation. At the beginning of the pandemic, one of the countries that suffered the most was Italy, which was helped very quickly by two Great Powers: Russia and China. However, the latter not only provided medical aid, but also technological and infrastructural support, which gave rise to several doubts about the genuineness of its benevolence. It is therefore essential to conduct a more thorough analysis of the political and economic aid provided by China. China has sought to maximize its commercial and political influence in Europe and Italy, enforcing trade between Asia and Europe after signing economic agreements with Italy in 2019 (also known as the "Belt and Road Initiative"). However, after Covid-19, China needed to reach consensus worldwide – and especially among Western countries – to heal its image as the origin country of the virus in order to reinforce its economic and political influence.
Neorealism and soft power are the most suitable means to tackle this case study and expose the true motives behind Chinese aid. Neorealism helps to explain why China helped Italy, while the concept of soft power elucidates how China achieved its hidden purposes. After defining and exploring the neorealist perspective and the soft power concept, this article will discuss the hidden reasons why China offered medical support to Italy during the pandemic.
Neorealism and Soft Power Approaches to Studying Chinese Behaviour
Although soft power is usually related to the liberalist perspective, linking this concept with the neorealist approach may be helpful in exploring the Chinese case study. Firstly, it is crucial to discuss the neorealist theory and its concept of power in order to comprehend how neorealism and soft power can co-exist in this exploratory framework.
Neorealism, or structural realism, is an International Relations theory that underlines the importance of states as self-interested actors whose primary pursuit is maximizing their security and power in the anarchic international system (Antunes et al., 2017). States act out of their own self interest, meaning that these actors seek their interests and are not prone to subordinating them to other states (Pashakhanlou, 2013). However, unlike realists, neorealist scholars believe that the power struggle between states is emphasized by the anarchic system rather than human nature. Moreover, in conformity with Schweller (1996, cited in Pashakhanlou, 2013), under a neorealist perspective, states are unitary actors behaving within this anarchical international system. It could be said that, during Covid-19, China behaved as an unitary actor and a self-interested nation, striving to optimize its own economic and political hegemonic interests.
Concerning the concept of soft power, according to Joseph Nye, the originator of the two concepts of soft power and hard power, "Hard power is push. Soft power is pull." (Nye, cited in Singh, 2012, p. 161) In other words, Ney insinuates that soft power is the capability to influence, seduce, and persuade others into a way of thinking in order to reach foreign policy aims. In contrast, hard power is usually understood in military contexts, and it involves several forms of coercion such as using force, threats, or economic sanctions (Ney, cited in Singh 2012, p. 161).
As noted above, the concept of soft power is usually associated with the liberalist theory because it is believed that soft power strengthens the likeliness of collaboration between states, rather than encouraging conflicts and war (Gomichon, 2013). For this reason, numerous neorealist authors have banished the concept of soft power as they deem that actors in International Relations react to only two incentives: force and economic motives. They consider that the realist conception of power underlines power as mainly equivalent to military force (Bilgin et al. 2008). Furthermore, contemporary literature highlights that realists are keen to exaggerate the relevance of military force in the survival of states in anarchic system (Bilgin et al., 2008), and, consequently, realism and neorealism appear to rely on the idea of hard power. Despite this, it is still possible to correlate the idea of soft power with the neorealist approach in International Relations, since, according to Ney (2011, cited in Gomichon, 2013, p. 82), "there is no contradiction between realism and soft power", due to soft power not being an arrangement of idealism or liberalism, but rather a form of power and a way of obtaining intended results. Huseynov (2018) agrees, arguing that soft power is used by states as a powerful and expansive instrument. Soft power is therefore seen here less as a theoretical approach, and more as a tool used to achieve states' final objectives, which, in China's case, involve becoming a political-economic hegemon (Loru, 2020).
The concept of hegemony itself is still highly debated among scholars. According to Dirzauskaite and Ilinca (2017), states are potential hegemons in both neorealism and neoliberalism theories. A hegemon is defined as a major state detaining the most power divided into direct (or hard) and indirect (or soft) power (Dirzauskaite et al., 2017). Hegemony is often interpreted as leadership or domination: the former is related to the concept of influence and soft power, whereas the latter focuses on hard power and coercion (Dirzauskaite et al., 2017). Therefore, it could be argued that, given the fact that China is using soft power, it is pursuing economic and political hegemony in a way that could been viewed as leadership, rather than coercive domination.
Peculiar, however, is the fact that even though Nye (2012, cited in The Soft Power 30, 2015) writes that there are three soft-power pillars (namely foreign policy, culture, and political values), it is evident that, in China's case, soft power heavily depends not only on political aspirations but also on economic influence and prestige (Carminati, 2020). Indeed, in conformity with Yukaruc (2017), researchers (such as Nye, 2004, and McClory, 2011) have recently demonstrated that the three pillars of soft power could be expanded to include other forms, such as culture, diplomacy, government, and business. Power is becoming less interchangeable. Therefore, coercion in power is losing relevance and giving way to co-option and soft power (Ney, 1990, cited in Yukaruc, 2017, p. 493). Similarly, John Wong’s (2016) study of China's soft power concluded that, although the economy strongly relies on hard power, Chinese policymakers have seen the growing economic leverage as presumably the most adequate means to advance the nation's soft power. In other ways, China has managed to model a unique form of economic soft power (John Wong, 2016, cited in Carminati, 2020), which encompasses competent economic diplomacy, outlined by commercial treaties. In fact, it is indisputable that, during the pandemic, Beijing guaranteed numerous types of assistance to Italy and more fragile countries, all of which depended on its economic potentialities (Carminati, 2020).
It can therefore be argued that Neorealism and soft power are two notions that can coexist, especially if relating them to China's behaviour towards Italy during the Covid-19 pandemic. After analysing neorealism and soft power, it is crucial to understand how China employed soft power during the pandemic.
Why is China employing soft power?
Since the pandemic, China has used economic soft power to reach its international interests of expanding of its political-economic leadership. Although the PRC's Ambassador stated that China's mix of aid (medical, economic, and technological) given to Italy during the first months of the pandemic was genuine (Gauttam et al., 2020) and that this "benevolent reciprocity" was a sign of gratitude towards Italy (who provided medical supplies to help China after the earthquake of 2008 (Ghiretti, 2020)), dual purposes hid behind this act of kindness.
Chinese purposes can firstly be reached by enhancing the image of a solidary nation (Sui Noi, 2020) and, secondly, by obtaining global consensus (Fallon, 2020). Hence, through this ability of persuasion and soft power, China succeeded in creating an image of a benevolent nation – using it to heal its reputation after Covid-19 spread from China and the subsequent disinformation campaign that reported the virus' Italian origin (Wallace, 2017). Notably, global and Italian consensus were obtained by employing soft power through two main strategies: humanitarian assistance and health diplomacy. These would have portrayed Beijing as a source of stability among European countries (Cui, 2020), especially considering that China offered its help to Italy after its EU neighbours blocked all medical supplies and raised protectionist barriers (Ghiretti, 2020). Consequently, economic soft power flawlessly explains the behaviour of the Chinese government by focusing on so-called economic diplomacy, since it is undeniable that China offered assistance in various forms because of its economic capabilities (Carminati, 2020). One of these forms of assistance, according to Mulakala et. al’s (2020) analysis, is the strategic, or health, diplomacy which involves Chinese humanitarian responses, the goal of which is enhancing China’s economic presence in Europe. More specifically, China engaged in "mask diplomacy" as a policy to repair its image. This included the depiction of a country behaving as a supplier and a donor of medical equipment to countries facing a severe Covid-19 outbreak, such as Italy (Wong, 2020). However, peculiar is the fact that, according to Alcaro (2020), Chinese aid was actually a part of regular commercial transactions, which, subsequently, renders Beijing's help not as genuine as the PRC tried to make it out to be.
Another strategy deployed by China involved online propaganda, which was used by a Chinese member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who posted an altered video on social media, showing Italians singing the Chinese national anthem as a sign of gratitude for its help (Gagliano, 2020). Through this propaganda, Beijing aspired to strengthen the idea of the saviour-nation, or "the country that came to the rescue of other nations," (Zeneli et al., 2020) implying that China was the only country able to beat the virus (Zeneli et al., 2020) rather than being the viral epicentre of Covid-19. Therefore, Chinese support has been configured as the ideal method to indirectly impose a particular narrative on public opinion, namely the greatness and benevolence of this country towards states struggling to combat the virus. To improve understanding of Chinese attitudes, however, it is necessary to delve deeper and analyse the additional reasons why Beijing employed soft power and helped Italy
How are China and Italy related to each other?
As declared by Chang (2020), for Beijing, the Covid-19 crisis represents, on the one hand, an international embarrassment and, on the other hand, an economic and socio-political crisis. It can be argued that, by negatively affecting the Italian economy, this health crisis would subsequently have afflicted China, too, taking into consideration that the two nations are partners in a global economic project. Therefore, although Italy is not a Great Power, the state still plays a crucial linking role in China's worldwide expansion (Zeneli et al., 2020). In fact, on March 25 2019, the two countries signed twenty-nine agreements, called the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), to enhance their political and commercial relationship (Perrone, 2019). The news of the signing of the agreements caused shock waves across the EU. Despite this, France also agreed to sign several documents with China, but, unlike Italy, it has decided not to do so alone and to cooperate with Germany (Dodman, 2019). By signing the agreements alone, Italy provided China with the opportunity to implement its own geo-economic and geopolitical strategies (Loru, 2020).
Firstly, these contracts promote China’s geo-economic strategy as Italy’s decision to play alone means giving too much freedom to China, making them more susceptible to geopolitical machinations of China. According to Wangke (2020), the effect of this could be the enforcement of a Chinese presence in the EU: the BRI is a colossal opportunity for Beijing to expand its economic influence through three continents: Asia, Europe, and Africa, respectively. China will surely gain extraordinary economic benefits through this net of trade, which, together with investments, will indeed favour its worldwide economic proliferation (Wangke, 2020). As Loru (2020) claims, the nature of Beijing's objectives are not purely economic, but also political. Gauttam et al. (2020) point out that China has taken advantage of the global health emergency by employing its global health diplomacy as a soft power instrument to widen its geopolitical power in terms of hegemony, and specifically leadership. The BRI is the most significant investment abroad after the Marshall Plan (1948), and it concerns relevant geopolitical, strategic, and imperialistic moves which are central in Beijing's foreign policy (Forthomme, 2019). Italy has always been in the spotlight due to its strategic position in the Mediterranean, its citizens' valuable skills, and its wealth. Consequently, China has decided to seek control there through this imperialistic initiative (Fallon, 2020). Moreover, China is enthusiastic about Italian infrastructures and ports, their design, and their tourism potential, and, therefore, Italy is the perfect location to start unravelling the US influence in Europe (Fallon, 2020). During the last decade, as Sibley (2015) asserts, China has emerged from being a state in crisis to a principal competitor, hence, the Sino-Italian relationship and their joint fight against the virus have been an uncomfortable narrative for the US, which would like to avoid the increase of Chinese ascendency in EU (Loru, 2020).
Moreover, 2020 was the year of the 50th anniversary of Sino-Italian diplomatic relations, which would have been celebrated with cultural events, and which would have been the perfect moment to intensify this relationship and China's presence in Europe (Amighini, 2020). Notwithstanding, due to the Covid-19, the events were cancelled, and China's opportunity to seek its goals in this manner faded as a result (Amighini, 2020). Additionally, the pandemic jeopardized the imperialistic economic project of the BRI (Di Donato, 2020). Ergo, the only way to reinforce the Sino-Italian relationship during a global health crisis was to collaborate with one's economic partner, with China showing itself to be the nation that managed to defeat the common enemy, which was the virus.
Despite that, from a neorealist perspective, and following the main characteristics of neorealism explained by Antunes and Camisao (2017) and Pashakhanlou (2013), this international cooperation can be defined as "egotistic," on account of the fact that China intended to achieve its national interests. Under the neorealist approach, states behave as actors worried about power, who are inclined towards conflicts and competition rather than collaboration (Grieco, 1988). Although the Chinese government does not seem to be predisposed toward conflict, in conformity with what has been discussed above, it is fair to argue that the Great Power is still inclined to compete with the US for dominance in Europe (Fallon, 2020). Furthermore, China is behaving as a self-interested actor, and, hence, it is inadequate to purely discuss "benevolence" in this case. Additionally, speaking in neorealist terms, it is arguable that Beijing appeared not to be prone to subordinating Chinese interests to other states but, on the contrary, decided to take advantage of the pandemic to chase its goals of political-economic leadership and expansion (Cui, 2020). The willingness to cooperate has been inhibited and replaced by a "false" collaboration which focuses on maintaining the already well-established Sino-Italian relationship.
Conclusion
To conclude, it is evident that the prime priority hiding behind Chinese benevolence towards Italy during the pandemic is economic hegemony in terms of leadership. Nonetheless, before reaching the concerned economic and political interests, considering that the pandemic originated in Wuhan, the Chinese government has had to deal first with the healing its contentious image as the source of the Covid-19 virus. Therefore, creating a new image of a solidary nation and obtaining a global consensus have been crucial for furthering its geopolitical aims.
The neorealist approach and soft power concept have been most effective in helping to examine the real motives behind Chinese aid and exploring how the country achieved its purposes. Nevertheless, the constructivist theory would also make for an extremely effective and interesting perspective from which to examine this case study, by basing the analysis on states' identities that constitute interests and actions (Basrur et al., 2020). Constructivism relies on the idea that international relations are historically and socially constructed, and are by no means related to any characteristic of world politics (Theys, 2017). So, at the basis of state interactions, there are shared forms, and thereby constructivists go beyond the material structure and reality to consider ideational structures, such as ideas and beliefs (Theys, 2017). In the constructivist approach, states are usually seen as actors that consider other states as "enemies," "rivals," or "friends" (Weins, 2015, p. 7). In the Sino-Italian relationship, whose roots go back to ancient times, China sees Italy more as a friend than a rival since their relationship appears, on the surface, to be harmonious.
Despite everything, Chinese hegemony will be surely enhanced not only politically, but also economically by its relationship with Italy in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Conversely, Italy could benefit from this relationship, but the risk of an economic downturn will persist, considering that, since March 25 2019, almost all Italian infrastructures and companies have been in China's hands.
Bibliographical References
Alcaro, R. (2020). Covid-19 Exposes Italy's Vulnerability To US-China Antagonism. IAI Istituto Affari Internationali. Available: https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/covid-19-exposes-italys-vulnerability-us-china-antagonism.
Amighini, A. (2020). I rapporti Italia-Cina dalla “Road-to-50” alla pandemia. ISPI. Available: https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/i-rapporti-italia-cina-dalla-road-50-alla-pandemia-28687.
Antunes, S. and Camisão, I. (2017). Realism, in S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (eds.). International Relations Theory. E-International Relations: Bristol, England.
Basrur, R. and Kliem, F. (2020). Covid-19 and International Cooperation: IR Paradigms at Odds. SN Social Sciences, 1(7).
Bilgin, P. and Elis, B. (2008). Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis. Insight Turkey, 10(2), pp. 5–20.
Carminati, D. (2020). The State of China’s Soft Power in 2020. E-International Relations: Bristol, England.
Chang, Y. (2020). The Post-Pandemic World: between Constitutionalized and Authoritarian Orders – China’s Narrative-Power Play in the Pandemic Era. 26, pp. 27-65.
Cui, M. (2020, 24 March). COVID-19: China Steps in to Help Italy Battle the Virus. DW. Available: https://www.dw.com/en/covid-19-china-steps-in-to-help-italy-battle-the-virus/a-52901560.
Di Donato, G. (2020). China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s Response. ISPI. Available:
Dirzauskaite, G. and Ilinca, N. C. (2017). Understanding “Hegemony” in International Relations Theory. Aalborg University. Available:
Fallon, T. (2020). China, Italy, and Coronavirus: Geopolitics and Propaganda. The Diplomat. Available:
https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/china-italy-and-coronavirus-geopolitics-and-propaganda/.
Gauttam, P., Singh, B. and Kaur, J. (2020). COVID-19 and Chinese Global Health Diplomacy: Geopolitical Opportunity for China’s Hegemony? Millennial Asia, 11(3), n. p.
Gagliano, G. (2020). Perché Cina e aziende cinesi aiutano l’Italia anti Covid- 19? Startmag. Available: https://www.startmag.it/mondo/cina-italia-coronavirus/.
Ghiretti F. (2020), China, Italy and Covid-19: Benevolent Support or Strategic Surge? IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali.
Gomichon, M. (2013). Joseph Nye on Soft Power. E-International Relations: Bristol, England.
Grieco, J. M (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), pp. 485-507.
Huseynov, V. (2018). The Nexus of Neoclassical Realism and Soft Power- The Case of The West-Russia Geopolitical Rivalries in the “Common Neighbourhood”. Dissertation for Conferral of a Doctoral Title by the Faculty of Social Sciences at Georg-August University of Göttingen. Available:
https://www.scribd.com/document/638643307/neoclassical-realism-and-soft-power
Loru, G. (2020, April 17). Perché la Cina aiuta l’Italia nella lotta alla pandemia. Starting Finance.
McClory, J. (2011). The New Persuaders II: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power. Institute for Government. Available:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/report/new-persuaders-ii
Mulakala, A. and Hongbo, J. (2020). Covid-19 and China’s Soft-Power Ambitions. The Asia Foundation.
Nye, J. S. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs: New York.
Pashakhanlou, A. H. (2013). Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism. E-International Relations: Bristol, England.
Sibley, G. (2015). Literature Review: China Through the Lens of Realism. [online] Academia. Available:
https://www.academia.edu/103394189/The_Rise_of_China_Through_the_Lens_of_Realism
Singh, N. K. (2012). Book Review: The Future of Power by Joseph S. Nye. World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 16(4), pp. 160-165.
Theys, S. (2017). Constructivism, in S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (eds.) International Relations Theory. E-International Relations: Bristol, England.
Weins, N. W. (2015). A Constructivist Perspective on the Rise of China: Regional and Global Scope [online]. ResearchGate. Available:
Wong, B. (2020, March 25). China’s Mask Diplomacy. The Diplomat. Available:
https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/chinas-mask-diplomacy/
Wong, J. (2016). China’s Rising Economic Soft Power. Asia Dialogue.
Yukaruc, U. (2017). A Critical Approach to Soft Power. Journal of Bitlis Eren University, 6(2), pp. 491-502.
Zeneli, V. and Santoro, F. (2020, June 9). China’s Disinformation Campaign in Italy. The Diplomat. Available:
https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/chinas-disinformation-campaign-in-italy/
Visual References
Comments